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ABSTRACT 
 
Transitions from authoritarian rule to fully-fledged democracy do not always proceed in a 
linear fashion. The complexity of the political systems in different countries prevents us from 
establishing one single model to explain their different experiences. However, comparative 
analyses of differing transitions to democracy give us insight into the conditions and actors 
influencing the processes.  
 
This study aims to clarify the military’s influence over transitions to democracy in two 
Southern European countries: Spain and Turkey. Spain and Turkey shared an authoritarian 
past, and experienced a transition to democracy by the late 1970s in the former and the early 
1980s in the latter. The military was a significant political actor in both countries. However, the 
Spanish military failed to influence the transition while their Turkish counterparts initiated and 
controlled the transition from above. These transitions differed not only in the initial conditions 
but also in the outcome. Spain, despite being ruled by an authoritarian regime almost a half-
century, achieved a consolidated democracy while Turkey still struggles with different 
challenges to democratic consolidation, including the current influence of the military in 
politics.  
 
This thesis helps to comprehend the conditions which led to different outcomes by focusing on 
one of the neglected actors in transitions to democracy: the military. Ostensibly, initial 
conditions explain the different outcomes, to a certain extent.Yet, this thesis concludes that 
conditions in the post-transition years were as influential as the initial conditions. Therefore, 
explaining the outcome only by referring to the initial conditions would be reductionist and 
misleading.  
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ÖNSÖZ 
 
Otoriter rejimlerden yerleşik demokrasilere geçiş her zaman çizgisel olarak ilerlememektedir. 
Farklı ülkelerdeki siyasal sistemlerin karmaşıklığı bizleri, farklı örnekleri açıklamak için tek tip 
bir model oluşturmaktan alıkoyar. Yine de, farklı demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerinin karşılaştırmalı 
analizleri, süreci etkileyen şartları ve aktörleri kavramımızı sağlar.  
 
Bu çalışma, ordunun, İspanya ve Türkiye gibi iki Güney Avrupa ülkesindeki demokrasiye geçiş 
süreçlerindeki etkisini açığa çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir.  İspanya ve Türkiye benzer bir otoriter 
geçmişe sahiptir. İspanya 1970’lerin sonunda, Türkiye ise 1980’lerin başında gibi demokrasiye 
geçiş süreçlerini yaşamışlardır. Ordu, iki ülkede de geçiş süreci öncesinde önemli bir siyasi 
aktör idi. Fakat İspanyol ordusu geçiş sürecini etkileyemez iken, Türk ordusu geçiş sürecini 
başlatmış ve geçişi tepeden kontrol etmiştir. Bu iki geçiş süreçleri sadece başlangıç şartlarında 
değil, sonuçlarında da farklılık göstermiştir. İspanya, yarım yüzyıla yakın bir süre otoriter bir 
rejim ile yönetilmiş olmasına rağmen yerleşik demokrasiye ulaşmış iken; Türkiye, halen 
ordunun siyasette halen var olan rolü de dahil olmak üzere, demokratikleşme sürecindeki 
sorunlar ile mücadele etmektedir.  
 
Bu tez, demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerini analiz eden çalışmalarda ihmal edilmiş aktörlerden biri 
olan orduya odaklanarak farklı sonuçlara yol açmış şartları anlamamamıza yardım eder. 
Göründüğü kadarı ile, başlangıçtaki şartlar farklı sonuçları bir ölçüde açıklamaktadır. Ancak, 
bu tez demokrasiye geçiş sonrası yıllardaki şartların başlangıç şartları kadar etkili olduğu 
sonucuna varmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, sonucu sadece demokrasiye geçiş sürecinin başlangıcındaki 
şartlara bağlı olarak açıklamak eksik ve yanlış yönlendirici olacaktır.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis comparatively analyzes the transition to democracy in two southern 
European states; Spain and Turkey. In both states transitions followed authoritarian 
rule; however the outcome of each transition differed. The political atmosphere in these 
countries differed significantly following the developments in early 1980s. Despite 
Turkey’s earlier experience with multiparty politics since 1950s, transition to 
democracy following military-rule in 1980-83 could only provide a partial democracy. 
On the other hand, Spain established a consolidated democracy in spite of the deep-
rooted authoritarian past with extensive restrictions in political and civil rights for 
almost a half century. Notwithstanding differing dynamics and actors in their politics, 
the military institutions of both states were among the key political actors during the 
authoritarian regimes and transitions. Henceforth, I find it important to study the 
military components and their roles in the comparison of transitions to democracy for 
both theoretical and empirical reasons, as Stepan suggested.1 
Nordlinger argues that armed forces of all countries exert considerable political 
influence. The armed forces are naturally the symbols of state sovereignty and the 
primary defenders against possible external or internal attack against the government. 
Armed forces, generally, claim that their intervention aims to restore political and 
economical stability. In their perception, military officers are detached from the 
interests of particular class and communal groups, devoid of the political weaknesses, 
                                                 
1. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (Princeton: Princeton Universtiy Press, 
1988), 8. 
 2
and highly skilled in technical and managerial matters.2 This self-perception provides 
justification for their intervention into politics if appropriate political system and 
adequate potential for influence are present.  
Therefore, transition to democracy in regimes with authoritarian elements is 
exposed to the armed forces’ interests. The modes of the intervention could be either a 
coup d’etat or instruments of the privileged position stemming from the previous 
regime. These involvements aim to guarantee the civilians to take into account the 
interests of the military in the future decision-making calculations if other interventions 
are to be averted. 3 
Focusing on the specific cases of this study, the different roles of the military in 
the transition processes are observed. Turkish military plays a pivotal role in transition 
to democracy in Turkey while Spanish military abstained from delineating and 
monitoring the policies or the leader of the government. 4 
Transitions to democracy should satisfy different pillars of society, including 
military, in order to pave the way for consolidation of democracy. Because, an 
institution with certain powers would release its privileges only if its interests are 
guaranteed. Hence, a “positive consolidation” which refers to conscious, long-term 
efforts by civilian elites to devise policies and strategies aimed at a positive 
reincorporation of the military into the goals and institutions of the new democratic 
regime, enables the system to function properly towards consolidation after the 
transitions.5 If not, the dissatisfied party would disrupt the process towards 
consolidation and would challenge the functioning of the system in the new 
democracies. Evidently, the perceptions of democracy change among the key actors of 
the system. The military might perceive certain privileges as tools for better functioning 
of political system and enduring influence of military in politics while they generate a 
threat towards democracy for its antagonists.  
                                                 
2. Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Coup d’etats and Governments (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1977), 22. 
3. Ibid, 7. 
4. Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in 
Comparative Perspective  (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 7-10. 
5. Geoffrey Pridham, “The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: 
Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective” in The Politics of Democratic 
Consolidation, ed. Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 169. 
 3
The scholarly works have attempted to analyze the differences of military 
influence in the politics in the post-authoritarian regimes. Stepan, revealed that the 
power of the military continues in the post-authoritarian regimes through the military 
prerogatives.6 While he adopts the strength of military in post-transition process as the 
source of this influence, some scholars preferred to explain the the degree of military 
influence by concentrating on the influential actors during the transition process. 
According to their view, the primary actors during the transitions determine the power 
balance in post-transition periods. When the military is the dominant actor during the 
transition, it grants a strong and indefinite foundation for exercising political leverage to 
retain its insitutional privileges in the post-transition era.7 Obviously, the transitions led 
by civilian actors are more inclined to consolidation of democracy. Either during the 
transition or following the transition, both authors claim that the influence is pre-
determined when the system starts to function and the institutions emerge. Thus, 
military will continue exerting influence in the new regime. On the other hand, several 
authors contested this view with findings from their researches focused in Latin 
America. As Hunter suggests, the enduring weight of these institutional restrictions are 
lessened by the rational human actions and potential for change. Her study allows for a 
more optimistic outlook for the future of democracy by challenging the claim that the 
regimes are destined to be influenced by the military in Latin American states.8 Pion-
Berlin, acknowledged the potencies of the military in post-authoritarian regimes, but 
denied the claim that they are limitless. He believes that the possibility of failing while 
attempting to intervene in fragile issues shape those limits. The military is rather 
stronger in pursuing its own corporate interests.9 Apparently, Turkish military exerts 
influence on the issues outside its own corporate interests, too. Whereas, the Spanish 
military was only able to attempt a coup which failed because of the firm stance of the 
                                                 
6. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 93. 
7. Francis Hagopian, “Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political pacts and 
Regime Transition in Brazil” Comparative Political Studies 23, no.2 (July 1990): 149; 
Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative 
Politics 23, no.1 (October 1990): 14.  
8. Wendy Hunter, “Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in 
Postauthorization Brazil” Comparative Politics 27, no.4 (Jul. 1995): 439.   
9. David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South 
America” Comparative Politics 25, no.1 (October 1992): 84. 
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civilian actors backed by King Juan Carlos, in 1981. This particular difference in post-
transition provides inspiration for comparative studies of these two states. In this 
manner, this thesis aims to explain the difference in the pace of demilitarization and 
civilianisation in Spain and Turkey following the transitions to democracy in 1980s. 
Eventually, this study tries to evaluate to what extent the nature of the dominant elite 
and the rational behaviours of the influential actors play a role in the transition to 
democracy.   
This study is intended to analyze the transition to democracy processes in Spain 
and Turkey by examining the main actors and dynamics during these processes. This 
type of a comparison will allow us to detect the comparative influence of military in the 
transitions to democracy of two states.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Transition to Democracy in Spain: 1975-1985 
 
 
The transition to democracy in Spain occurred between 1975 and 1985 following 
the death of General Franco. Among the different examples of transitions to democracy, 
the experience in Spain constitutes an ideal case where different parties in society were 
able to find a common ground upon which they could agree on the reform process, and 
establish a constitutional system based on democratic elections open to free 
competition. The main issue which arose prior to the constituent process concerned the 
question of whether a consensus of opinion or a lack of consensus would exist during 
the transition and constituent processes when Francoist regime’s authoritarian, 
corporatist and centralised decision-making authority would be challenged.10 The 
literature on the Spanish transition is enriched through various studies which analyse the 
actors and dynamics of the process by game-theoretical analysis11, which focus on the 
Francoist regime’s inheritance on the Spanish transition and the party systems of Spain 
during and after the transition12; which analyse the political economy of the regime and 
                                                 
10. Richard Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain” in The Politics of 
Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations, ed. Keith B. Ganting and Richard Simeon 
(Hong Kong: Macmillan Press, 1985) , 43.  
11. Josep M. Colomer, “Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way”,  The 
American Political Science Review 85, no.4 (Dec.1991): 1283-1302. 
12. José María Maravall and Julián Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the 
Prospects for Democracy” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, 
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its consequences13; which explain the dynamics of the politics of constitution making14 
and through in-depth explanations of main events provided by historians.15 This chapter 
mainly aims to analyze how Francoist legacy affected the actors in the transition to 
democracy and to clarify the dynamics and the actors involved in the transition process 
in Spain. Thus, further chapters of this thesis which will analyse the role of the military, 
will be understood better when the role of other institutions or even individuals are 
examined in a comparative manner.  
 
 
2.1 Roots of Democratic Opposition in Franco’s Spain 
 
  Evidently, the transition in Spain commenced with the crisis of the existing 
regime - Franco’s authoritarian regime. In other words, the dynamics and actors of the 
transition were inherited from Franco’s long-standing authoritarian rule following the 
Civil War in the late 30s. Political actors with contradictory views participated in the 
democratization process and produced a series of pacts and negotiations. The Spanish 
transition became a good example of transition occurring through agreement, consent 
and compromise during the political operation which allowed the replacement of the 
authoritarian regime with a democratic regime. The Spanish terms “ruptura pactada”16 
and “reforma pactada”17 have become a part of the political science literature.  
Franco’s authoritarian regime had suppressed competitive political parties on the 
grounds that partisan conflicts harmed the integrity of Spain. Censorship, restriction of 
rights of association and assembly and recruitment of political posts by appointment 
                                                                                                                                               
ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore : 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 71- 117. 
13. José María Maravall, Los Resultados de la Democracia (The Consequences of the 
Democracy), (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1995). 
14. Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 42-71. 
15. Viktor Alba, Transition in Spain, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978). 
16. The term means the lack of political continuity between two regime types and the 
principles of legitimation that support them. 
17. The term means the element of legal continuity through which the change was put 
into practice with a high degree of formal respect for the legality of Franco’s political 
system. 
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rather than mass suffrage were the practices and institutionalization of the regime to 
entrench its power.18 
Apparently, at the time of the Franco’s death the Francoist regime was different in 
comparison to its initial stages following the Civil War. The regime itself had already 
incorporated liberal elements in social and political lives. The regime attempted to shift 
the course of events in the economic conditions of Spain in the late 1950s through a 
series of liberalizing policies in the economy. This policy choice led to a growth in the 
industrial sector and a rise in productivity and urbanization. These positive economic 
indicators also allowed the regime to survive through a “passive consent” for at least 
one more decade. As expected, urbanization and industrialization of the population in 
large numbers became the inevitable consequences of the liberalized economy. As a 
part of the liberalization of economy, a certain degree of liberalization in the industrial 
sectors was required. That liberalization included rights for the industrial workers 
ranging from flexibility of representation in the official syndicates to a reduction in the 
penalties for strikers. Also, the growth of the industrial sector and the imbalanced 
distribution of the social product caused a dramatic increase in industrial conflict.19  The 
liberalization of the economic relations gave way to a similar trend in political relations 
in Spain.  The Munich Convention in 1962, where leaders of democratic opposition in 
exile gathered, epitomizes this democratic expansion. 20 Nevertheless, it is hard to argue 
that economic liberalisation, by itself, explains the level of political liberalisation in 
Spain. As revealed by earlier experiences, the relationship between economic and 
political liberalisation might be accidental or even negative. Contextual factors 
including structural, historical, international and domestic factors are important in 
explaining the process of economic and political change.21 China constitutes a very 
recent example supporting the sceptics of liberalisation. Transition to market economy 
                                                 
18. Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 42-3. 
19. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 75. 
20. Ibid, 75. 
21. Hamilton and Kim analyzes two different cases - South Korean and Mexican - of 
economic and political liberalisation and concludes that economic liberalisation led to 
different outcomes in democratisation of these two countries. They emphasised the 
importance of contextual factors in determining the outcome of the transition process.  
Nora Hamilton and Eun Mee Kim, “Economic and Political Liberalisation in South 
Korea and Mexico” Third World Quarterly 14, no.1 (1993): 132-3.  
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and increasing international economic relations has not paved the way for 
democratisation in China, yet. 22 Hence, economic and political liberalisation does not 
necessarily occur simultaneously. Economic liberalisation may sometimes have this 
effect, but needs to be accompanied by loss of will by the previous elite to continue 
autocratic government, and/or agreement among civilian forces on the need for political 
liberalisation to have a positive effect on the process of democratisation. Apparently, 
Spanish case constitutes an example where the agreement among civilian forces 
accompanied the economic liberalisation toward political liberalisation.  
The weakness of the bourgeoisie had been one of the characteristics of Spanish 
society. However, through the “Prussian” style of economic growth, where financial 
aristocracy and state were responsible for economic growth, the financial aristocracy 
played a considerable role in the construction of national industry. El Instituto Nacional 
de Industria (National Industrial Institution) helped the accumulation of capital and the 
creation of industrial infrastructure. Thanks to the “Prussian” style of economic 
development, a new industrial bourgeoisie and a wave of “new directors” in the 
government banking system and industry existed. Nevertheless, the liberal ideas existed 
even among these staunch collaborators of the Francoist regime, the financial 
aristocracy. Differing views about the economic development and the role of the state 
caused fragmentation within the ruling class, thus the relative strengthening of the 
middle class.23 The bourgeoisie was already facing difficulties in terms of interest 
representation within the Francoist Spain’s corporatism. The corporatist structure in 
Spain was a uniform structure, in the sense of being inserted into a state devoid of 
alternative representational forms.24 The labours’ interests could only be represented by 
these vertical organisations in which positions were dominantly filled by the members 
of the Movimiento Nacional25 (National Movement).26 As a whole, “the relative 
                                                 
22. Ma Ying, “China’s Stubborn Anti-Democracy”, Policy Review 141 (February-
March 2007): 4-5 
23. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 76. 
24. Joe Foweraker, “Corporatist Strategies and Transition to Democracy in Spain”  
Comparative Politics 20, no.1 (Oct 1987): 61. 
25. Fascist inspired mechanism of Franco’s state which pretended to be the only cause 
of participation in Spanish Public life. 
26. Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 44. 
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political disarticulation and predominantly conservative orientation of the bourgeoisie 
posed serious problems for the transition from authoritarianism to democratic rule”.27 
During the Civil War, General Franco’s alliance with the Catholics and Falangists 
against the Second Republic had secured him a victory.28 Therefore, the inclusion of 
these parties in the state apparatus was not surprising. However, as he implemented his 
new economic policies in 1960s, the cooperation among the regime’s stronger parties 
worsened. Franco resisted the Catholic’s liberal projects and the Falangist’s endeavours 
to increase the authoritarian elements of the regime. Therefore, as the collaborators of 
the Francoist regime in the government lost their intimacy with the head of the regime, 
a new party, Opus Dei29, became an effective actor in the Spanish political arena. Thus, 
the coalitional equilibrium in the Francoist government had shifted away from the 
Catholics and Falangists in favour of Opus Dei. The internal conflicts continued to grow 
throughout Franco’s life. In addition to changing dynamics within the coalition, the 
working class acted in an organized manner which eventually led to the reorganization 
of the democratic opposition against the regime. 30 
The positive correlation between the age of Franco and the internal factions 
caused the deterioration and decay of the regime especially in the last decade before the 
transition to democracy. Despite the deep-rooted authoritarian elements, the regime 
itself necessitated change as a remedy for economic and political decay. Maravall and 
Santamaria summarize the deterioration and decay in the regimes in three main stages, 
as depicted in the Table 1. The common characteristics of the three stages were the 
internal factions among the stronger parties of the regime, the reorganization of workers 
as a result of their requests for political rights and the succession problem of the regime. 
 
 
   
                                                 
27. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 78. 
28. the Falange was a fascist political organization founded by José Antonio Primo de 
Rivera in 1933 in opposition to the Second Spanish Republic. It also incorporated 
nationalist elements during the Franco regime. 
29. Opus Dei was semisecret religious society and supported the new economic policy 
of Franco. 
30. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 76-7. 
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Table 1. Periods of Deterioration and Decay in the Regime Before the Transition in 
Spain 
The periods of  
decay and 
deterioration 
The regime itself   Main groups of        conflict 
The controversial       
issues 
     1965-1968 Tensions among the regime factions 
Falangists versus 
Opus Dei 
The future of the 
Falangist Movement 
and the succession 
problem 
    1969-1973 
No internal 
cohesion in the 
regime 
Opus Dei under 
General Carrero 
Blanco versus the 
rest 
Succession 
Problem, 
Liberalization and 
Increasing 
unofficial violence 
      1973-1975 
Inability of the 
regime to adapt to 
change 
Liberalization 
versus “el bunker” 
Statute for Political 
Associations which 
could abolish the 
restriction 
Source: Maravall and Santamaria, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 77. 
 
In the first period, between 1965 and 1968, the tension among the factions of the 
regime increased substantively. The economic role of the state and the 
institutionalization of the regime were the issues with diverging interests for the 
regime’s key actors. In order to determine the main components and the institutions of 
the regime the Ley Organica del Estado (Organic Law of the State) was approved by a 
referendum in December 1966.31 Ley Organica del Estado is a reference for the role and 
obligations of institutions in order to strengthen the Francoist structure. The main 
contrasting points between the Falangists and the Opus Dei were related to the future of 
the Falangist movement and the regime’s succession problem. The Falangists, 
obviously, attempted to institutionalize the movement into the regime and expected to 
wait for Franco’s death for the succession. However, the Opus Dei was in favour of the 
dissolution of the movement into a loose framework and the restoration of the monarchy 
prior to Franco’s death so that Franco would be present during the initial years of 
succession. This conflict between these two factions in cabinet ended with the 
dissolution of the cabinet in October 1969. 32 
                                                 
31. Portal Fuenterrebollo, “Ley Organica del Estado”, Fuenterrebollo, 
http://fuenterrebollo.com/Franco/ley-organica.html, (accessed on April 12, 2007). 
32.  Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 77. 
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  The second period, between 1969 and 1973, was administered by a “mono-
color” government under the leading figure of General Carrero Blanco, a Francoist. 
During the government of Carrero Blanco, the Falangists had already passed away in its 
transformation into the Movimiento Nacional (National Movement).33 Carrero Blanco 
was the first president of the government during the Franco period and was aware that 
the death of Franco would also mean the end of the Francoist regime if the necessary 
precautions were not taken.34 In order to provide the internal cohesion of the regime 
repressive policies were applied not only to the working class as in the previous years 
but also to the universities, opposition groups and even to certain priests. Nevertheless, 
since there was only one effective party in the government, Opus Dei, the efforts for 
internal cohesion were fruitless. All levels of society became involved in the conflict. 
The condemnation of nine Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) militants to death by a martial 
court mobilized the political opposition. The protests were organized among the 
workers by Spanish political exiles residing in various European capitals. ETA 
retaliated with kidnapping an honorary consul in Bilbao. Despite the Spanish bishops 
and the Pope demanding that the condemned men should be pardoned, Franco only 
commuted the nine death sentences to life imprisonment. Nevertheless, that event 
signalled the ability of the mass population to become mobilized and exert influence 
over Franco’s government in favour of the militants against the regime itself in late 
60s.35  
The Catholic Church demanded liberal openings in the regime. Nevertheless, 
repressive policies caused their further disenchantment with the regime. As a result, 
during this “mono-color” government of Carrero Blanco, the Catholic Church, a 
collaborator of the Francoist regime since the Civil War, explicitly acknowledged its 
error in taking sides with the Francoists.36 The Catholic Church had obtained certain 
privileges from Franco in exchange for Franco’s important role in the appointing of 
                                                 
33. By the early 1970s, it reduced to a Status of a patronage-dispensing bureaucracy 
with no political importance. 
34. Alba, Transition in Spain, 234. 
35. Ibid, 235. 
36. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 78. 
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bishops.37 Franco’s influence over the Catholic Church was already disturbing. As soon 
as they started losing their privileged position in the regime their discontent was voiced 
more than before.  
The number of strikes in 1972 reached its peak during Franco’s regime. Taking 
into account all of these regime crises, the survival of the regime after Franco was seen 
to necessitate Carrero Blanco being appointed as the head figure. Nevertheless, the 
assassination of Carrero Blanco by ETA in December 1973 changed the dynamics of 
the government and risked the power of Opus Dei in the government. 38 
Following the assassination of Blanco, Arias Navarro, the Minister of the Interior 
during the Blanco Government, was elected for presidency. Navarro’s government 
programme promised aperture (opening) which meant more freedom of expression, 
prospective free elections and political parties, all of which would allow Spain to enter 
the European Economic Community. The appointment of Navarro and his government’s 
programme signalled a rapid democratization of the regime sought by people under fifty 
who had not been involved with the Civil War in the late 30s. On the other hand, 
liberalization policies exacerbated the extremist supporters of Franco’s regime. The so- 
called “Bunker” or antiaperturistas (anti-opening), who were alive during the Civil 
War, were resistant to change in the regime. Nevertheless, the world economic crisis 
and the oil problem affected Spain and the strikes spread all around the country despite 
efforts toward apertura.39 The Leftists took advantage of the increased freedom to give 
a final impulse to its reconstitution as a political force. 
Navarro’s government could not realize the liberalising reforms in order to 
reconstruct the social bases of Franco’s political system.40 The “bunker” succeeded in 
failing the Statute for Political Associations which aimed at legalizing the political 
associations. The failure of the government indicated the regime’s inability to adapt to 
cyclical tendencies. On the left, the number of strikes was increasing by large 
percentages in 1973, and various political alternatives emerged in Paris with 
correspondents in each provincial capital in Spain. As Maravall and Santamaria claim, 
                                                 
37. Edward J. Houbel, “Church and State in Spain: Transition Toward Independence 
and Liberty” Western Political Quarterly 30, no.1 (March 1977): 135. 
38. Alba, Transition in Spain, 235. 
39. Ibid, 237. 
40. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
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the democratic opposition became a “credible alternative” rather than a source of 
division. 41 
Franco’s unexpected illness during Navarro’s government caused two negative 
developments both for the “opening” endeavours and for the prince Juan Carlos. Since 
the government became aware of its inability to adopt openings in the regime, they 
decided to resign on the condition that Franco would be asked to return to power despite 
his illness. This secret consent was transmitted to Franco by the “bunkers”. This event 
led to the resignation of the Ministry of Information and some loyal ministers in the 
cabinet. Even though the new members of the cabinet promised to continue opening, the 
suspension of magazines and books created an obstacle to the freedom of press. In 
addition, the prince who replaced Franco during his illness had to leave the office as 
soon as Franco was back. While this was a humiliating development for a prince, his 
silent consent provided him with a good reputation for his potential as Franco’s 
successor.42 The removal of aperturistas (openists) from power stimulated the 
democratic opposition to support the old Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish 
Socialist Worker Party- PSOE) in large numbers. The Communists organized an 
oppositional platform, Junta Democratica (Democratic Junta) in Paris, and supported 
Don Juan, the prince’s father, who delivered speeches emphasising democracy and 
liberal values.43 
The Armed Forces, despite their commitment to the Francoist regime, also 
contained opposition groups against the removal of openists from the government. In 
1975, the government arrested eleven military men, captains and commanders, all of 
whom were also lawyers, engineers, or other professionals. These army members were 
accused of forming an alternative, Union Militar Democratica (Democratic Military 
Union-UMD) within the army. This development also could be intended in order to 
place barriers against politicization of the army in the future. Thus, the democratic 
opposition would be pleased to see the regime’s conflict with the army. 44 
Violence had always been a characteristic of Spain but from 1969 it became a 
form of terrorism by small groups, especially ETA. There was a general feeling among 
                                                 
41. Ibid, 80. 
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43. Ibid, 240. 
44. Ibid, 241. 
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the democratic opposition that the “bunker” used violence in order to justify the 
repression. The murdering of police in the Basque region caused the deterioration of 
relations between the government and the police. The government lost its authority over 
the police. In order to hide this fact, an Anti-terrorist Law went into effect in 1975. The 
execution of five members caused a reaction from Western states, especially Europe; if 
not the United States. Twelve European governments removed their ambassadors from 
Spain. The European Economic Community decided to suspend negotiations for a trade 
treaty with Spain. It was the biggest reaction against the Franco regime since 1948 when 
Spain was isolated by the United Nations.45 Therefore, by the end of the 1975 Spain 
came close to being isolated from international politics. 
 
 
2.2 After Franco  
 
At the end of the November 1975, Franco died. His supposed successor Carrero 
Blanco had already been assassinated in 1973. Thus, as agreed during Franco’s last 
years, Juan Carlos de Borbon was crowned King Juan Carlos I of Spain on November 
22, 1975. Since Juan Carlos replaced Franco before constitutional amendments, he held 
excessive powers for a constitutional monarch compared to his European counterparts. 
However, Juan Carlos lacked popular legitimacy. In order to achieve this, he would 
either resort to a referendum for his presidency or lead a democratic transformation. He 
had attempted to form closer relationships with different pillars of society when he was 
the prince. For example, the prince abstained from replacing Franco at one time, 
because of prior experience where he acted in a ludicrous manner. Instead of replacing 
Franco, he went to the Sahara where Spain had political problems with Morocco and 
told the army to support the Spanish stance by using force, if necessary. This sort of 
leadership naturally provided support for him within the army. This sympathy towards 
the prince among the members of the army would be a signal for the future cooperation 
of the two parties.46 In his first declaration at the presidency takeover he pledged to 
uphold “the principles inspired by the Movimiento Nacional”. He also promised the 
efficiency of the armed forces. After expressing his “respect and gratitude” for Franco, 
he added that “a just order, equal for all, would allow recognition, within the unity of 
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the kingdom, of regional characteristics.” Thus, the king pledged that all Spaniards 
would be heard and that none would be privileged. Still, the legislators gave Franco’s 
daughter a much longer ovation than they had given the king. This example can be seen 
as a discordant between the regime’s dynamics and the new monarch.47 
As soon as the King replaced Franco, the liberals and democratic opposition 
voiced their concerns. The Catholic Church opted for liberal values through the 
declaration of the Cardinal Archbishop of Madrid, Monsignor Vicente Enrique y 
Tarancon, where he said that the church was ready “to speak out and shout if ever 
necessary on behalf of liberty and human rights”.  The Church demanded an amnesty 
for political prisoners, but the King only settled for a pardon.  Don Juan, the father of 
the new king, believed that the monarchy would only benefit society as a whole if it 
became an arbitrating power which would make it easier to surmount the effects of the 
Civil War, establish social justice, eliminate corruption, consolidate a pluralistic 
democracy, integrate Spain into the European Community and to afford the Spanish 
nation peaceful access to the national sovereignty.  Otherwise, if these goals were not 
realized, all that would be achieved would be the replacement of Franco with a 
monarchy. 48 Hence, at the time of the Franco’s death, the main actors and their main 
concerns were as follows: 
Table 2. The Main Actors in Spanish Politics After Franco 
Key actors  Main Concerns 
Church  Withdrew their support from the regime in 1971, ask 
amnesty and demand liberal values 
Falangists- transformed into 
National Movement 
Aims  to institutionalize the Falangist movement 
within the structure of the state 
Opus Dei Dissolution of the Francoist elements and restoring the 
Monarchy 
Industrial Bourgeoisie Perceives the dictatorship as an obstacle to economic 
integration with Europe 
Middle Classes Sees the democratic opposition as a credible 
alternative 
Army  Providing support for the regime, thus for the 
government through monopoly of repressive apparatus 
The Leftists Increasing strikes and the resurgence of Socialist party 
in 1972. Political movements in Paris with connection 
in Spain. 
Source: Alba, Transition in Spain, 241 and Maravall and Santamaria, “Political 
change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy”, 78-80 
                                                 
47. Ibid, 251. 
48. Ibid, 252. 
 16
 
For any significant change in the system, Cortes (Spanish Parliament) and 
Consejo Del Reino (Council of the Realm) had to agree. Cortes and the Council of the 
Realm were functioning as the control mechanism for the Francoist regime. The power 
of the government was limited by the approval of the Cortes in important issues.  Their 
inner structures of these institutions were as follows. 
According to the structure in Table 2, only the 108 family legislators, the 30 
representatives from professional associations and the 6 representative from Royal 
Academies were selected without the legal intervention of Franco, caudillo. 
Table 3. The Structure of the Spanish Cortes 
 The Institution                       Number of Members          How were they elected? 
Government Around 20 ministers  
National Council of the 
National Movement  
95 
Elected by Franco or by 
institutions within the 
National Movement whose 
leaders are elected by 
Franco 
The President of Supreme 
Court         1 
Elected by Franco 
4 high official and Bishops 4 Elected by Franco 
Legislators (procuradores) 
25 
Named by the chief of 
state in consultation with 
the Council of Realm 
University Deans 
 12 
Subject to Franco’s 
approval for appointment 
Presidents of the royal 
academies 6 
 
Representatives from 
professional associations 30 
 
 
Union legislators 
150 
36 chosen by virtue of the 
position they held in the 
union organization, the 
rest were designated by 
union leaders 
“family” legislators who 
formed the so-called family 
 108 
Named by heads of 
families and married 
women after first having 
been approved as 
candidates by provincial 
authorities 
Legislators 115 Municipal and Provincial authorities 
Source: Alba, Transition in Spain, 250-5 
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In addition the Council of the Realm, which was supposed to be the restricting 
force of the regime’s important institutions (the Parliament and the King), was 
comprised of the following members: the senior prelate (a member of parliament), the 
senior office of the armed forces, the head of the general staff of the armed forces, the 
president of the Supreme Court, the president of the Council of State (the chief of 
state’s consulting body), the president of the Hispanic Institutes, ten members of 
Parliament elected by the legislators, the president of Parliament. All of these members 
of the Council of Realm were subject to the head of state’s designations. Therefore, the 
head of state influenced the council to a large extent.49 
One of the Council of Realm’s functions was to present the chief of state with a 
list of three candidates from which to select the president of government and the 
president of Parliament. In addition the Council of Realm advised the chief of state on 
whether or not he should veto a law approved by Parliament and also with regard to all 
the measures that affected the functioning of institution. As a result of these, Francoists’ 
consent seemed compulsory for a significant change in the system as a whole. To sum 
up, most of the positions within these two important institutions were filled by 
Francoists.50 Juan Carlos, by replacing Franco, without any constitutional and 
institutional change in the system would mean the transferring of powers to a new 
monarch. However, the events resulted in a different outcome.  
 
 
2.3 The Elections  
 
Following the death of General Franco, King Juan Carlos named Carlos Arias 
Navarro as the new head of government. Arias was the successor of Blanco. During his 
first government he had included openists in the government but he was indeed a 
continuist and never attempted to transform the regime into a pluralistic democracy. The 
Leftist had transformed their main pillars, Junta Democratica and Plataforma de 
Convergencia,(The Convergence Platform)into Coordinacion Democratica(Democratic 
Coordination) in order to exert influence over the government. Even though Arias 
disclosed his reformist project, his unwillingness to negotiate with the opposition 
caused the King’s unrest. Juan Carlos, who sought for popular legitimacy, knew that 
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only parliamentary democracy would firm his power and guarantee the reforms’ 
consolidation in the long run. The openists of the government attempted to persuade the 
continuist in the mixed Commission between representatives of the government and the 
Consejo Nacional de Movimiento (Council of National Movement) which included 
many Francoists. However, the pressure that the openists exerted over the continuists 
was insufficient and consequently the reform negotiations failed. Popular movements in 
the forms of strikes and demonstrations increased in Spain during this failed negotiation 
period.51 This failure ended with the replacement of Arias with Adolfo Suarez. Suarez 
promised to submit to the nation a project of constitutional reform which would include 
the general elections before June 1977. Suarez presented a bill for political reform and 
submitted it for the consideration of both the commanders of the armed forces and the 
Cortes. Suarez proposed the continuity of monarch in the person of Juan Carlos de 
Borbon, who had already been designated as Franco’s successor, the maintenance of the 
“unity of Spain” and the exclusion of the Communists.52 Suarez also accepted to reform 
the electoral system allowing representation in rural areas and the establishment of a 
second chamber elected by a plurality system with a certain number of senators 
designated by the king.53 Rather than Arias’ proximity with continuists, Suarez placed 
himself in an intermediate position between rupturists and continuists. 54 
In order to prevent the intervention of the military into politics, the army chief of 
staff and Suarez’ collaborator Lieutenant General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, called for 
political abstention by all military commanders under threat of expulsion from the 
military. This threat proved to be real as Lieutenant General Fernando de Santiago was 
dismissed and relegated to the reserve when he expressed his disagreement with the 
government project on labour unions. Suarez’s concession was the prohibition of the 
Spanish Communist Party from the forthcoming elections. Suarez also pressured the 
members of the Cortes named by Franco not to vote against the reform by threatening 
them with the dispossession of their posts in state companies, and by making public the 
recordings of telephone taps the government secret services had made in their homes 
                                                 
51. Colomer, “Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way”: 1292. 
52. Ibid, 1292. 
53. Ibid, 1293. 
54. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 82. 
 19
and offices and by the transmission on television of the nominal vote of their bill for 
reform in case they decided to vote “no”.55 Hence he provided the acceptance for the 
reform of the authoritarian regime by the Francoists in the institutions. Suarez had 
already formed an agreement with the Church and the financial aristocracy.56 Suarez 
was confident that the reform would not jeopardize the foundations of the capitalist 
system. A referendum was made on 15 December 1976 and 94 percent approved the 
Suarez’s constitution which aimed to create a transition to democracy. Hence, the 
eleven-month period since Suarez came to power provided important results for 
establishing a constitutional democracy satisfying all parties. The Suarez government 
declared amnesty for political prisoners, replaced vertical syndicates with class-based 
trade unions and disbanded the Movimiento Nacional with the purpose of establishing 
political parties.  The Suarez government ensured that no political party or group would 
be able to complain about their role in the construction of the new regime.57 Suarez had 
considerable success in dealing with the resistance of the continuists “and in leading the 
democratic opposition to accept limitations, and the content and the procedures of “legal 
reformism”. That made Suarez the natural leader of the Unión de Centro Democrático 
(Union of Democratic Center-UCD) which would be the party comprising several actors 
of democratic opposition joining together under one party to enter into elections.58 
The reformists within the government headed by Suarez were never able to 
establish cooperation with the rupturist opposition. Suarez only agreed to some of their 
basic demands such as extension of the political amnesty, a proportional electoral law, 
and legalization of the parties extended to cover the PCE (the Spanish Communist 
Party) and the dissolution of the Movimiento. 59 
The rupturist opposition’s various parties joined together in the Plataforma de 
Organismos to defend the formation of a provisional government with the participation 
of the opposition. Their main concern was to convoke elections without any advantage 
for one group along with the parallel establishment of regional governments in 
                                                 
55. Colomer, “Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way”: 1293. 
56. Maravall and Santamaría, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 83. 
57. Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 48. 
58. Maravall and Santamaria, “Political change in Spain and the Prospects for 
Democracy”, 84-6. 
59. Ibid, 87.  
 20
Catalonia and the Basque country, freedom of activity for all parties and the free choice 
by the constituent Cortes of the forms of state and government.60 This Plataforma 
sought to establish ground for negotiation with the Suarez government by designating a 
nine-man commission. However, Suarez’s sole concession was his consent on 
establishing direct conversation with the general secretary of the Communist Party, 
Santiago Carrillo for the legalization of his party. Suarez and Carrillo also agreed on the 
monarchy and the two-colored monarchical flag.  Suarez, rather than compromising 
with the democratic opposition, used these conversations with the opposition as a threat 
against the continuists as a possible alternative if the continuists do not agree with 
Suarez’ reform proposals. Thus, according to Colomer, the Spanish transition was a 
reform pactada within the ruling bloc.61 
Spain entered a new phase with the elections. Spaniards participated in the 
election with significant turnouts.62 In fact, the electors were moderate and by the time 
of elections 40 percent of the population placed itself in the middle position. The 
average position on the ideological scale from 1 to 10 was 5.47. 63  
As we see from the below figure, the first democratic elections held in Spain in 
1977 provided positive results for the transition to democracy. Instead of the extremist 
factions in the society (Communists and Francoists) the centrist parties, UCD and 
PSOE gained majority of the votes.  
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Table 4. The 1977 Election Results of Spanish Cortes 
Political Parties % of votes # of seats in Cortes 
UCD 34.5 165 
PSOE 29.4 118 
PCE 9.4 20 
AP 8.2 16 
Others 18.3 31 
Source: Election Sources, “Elections to the Spanish Congress of Deputies - 
ResultsLookup”,http://www.electionresources.org/es/congress.php?election=1977 
(accessed on April 21, 2007) 
Party names and acronyms: Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of Democratic 
Center-UCD), Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker Party- 
PSOE), Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain - PCE), Alianza 
Popular (Popular Alliance - AP). 
 
This preference indicated that Spaniards no longer felt the necessity of 
guardianship imposed by Franco which constituted the justification for his dictatorship 
and also implied an extension and renovation of the strategy of compromise and pact-
making. An analysis of democratic legitimacy of Spanish transition reveals that Spanish 
political culture was not inherently undemocratic, or that it did not harbour politically 
significant pockets of anti-democratic sentiments during the transition.64  Between 1978 
and 1994 the percentage of Spaniards who perceived the democracy as the best system 
of governance never remained below 69 percent. During the same period highest 
support for an authoritarian regime was only 12 percent among the Spaniards. Taking 
these numbers into account, it was very difficult to distinguish Spaniards’ support for 
democracy from other Western European countries. Considering the turbulent 
circumstances that surrounded the transition such as political violence and attempted 
coup and economic crises, solid support for democracy in Spain was noteworthy. 65 In 
addition, Spaniards’ confidence towards their armed forces does not significantly differ 
from other Western Europeans. According to World Value Survey data collected in 
1981, 63 percent of the Spaniards had confidence in their armed forces, while 58 
percent of Swedes, 53 percent of the French, and 42 percent of the Dutch had 
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confidence in their armed forces. 66 The Spanish army’s historical affiliation with the 
Spanish monarchy until Franco’s era and the consequences of Spanish Civil War had 
provided military a privileged role in Spanish politics and a prestigious place among the 
Spaniards, nevertheless this was not adequate to convince Spaniards that an 
authoritarian regime would be more appropriate than a democratic one. 67  
However, there were significant problems remaining which needed to be solved 
such as, drafting the new constitution, the struggle against the economic crisis, the 
institutionalization of regional autonomies. In addition, since UCD failed to gain 
majority of the seats in the Cortes, they required to compromise with other parties 
within and outside the Cortes in order to pass the reforms. The armed forces were 
suspicious about any concession made for the autonomy of the various regions since 
they adopted their role as the guard of the territorial integrity. On the making of 
constitution, the rightist and the leftist parties were divided. While the rightists 
demanded a short constitution, institutionalizing the monarch and empowering the 
cabinet with clear supremacy over the parliament, the leftist parties demanded a limited 
parliamentary monarch with well defined powers and rigidity for amendment procedure 
covering all possible revisions of a progressive and detailed bill of rights that was to 
preface the constitution. The Leftist also demanded the state’s powers in economic 
initiatives and proportionality in future electoral law. The two largest parties of the Left 
were traditionally opposed to the concept of the monarchy.68 In addition, the guarantees 
provided for the existence of a capitalist economy in order to satisfy the financial 
aristocracy and the special position of the Catholic Church and the armed forces within 
the Spanish state were recognized.69 The whole constituent process in 1977-78 included 
various types of negotiation and a political power game among the parties. 70 Differing 
degrees of success and failure were reached during the negotiations according to 
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different topics. While the parties reached a consensus on the post-Franco reform 
agenda, the position of the monarchy, the legalization of the political parties and 
constitutional enshrinement of basic civil and political rights; the parties lacked 
agreement on the Basque regional autonomy. In addition, over religious issues, the 
electoral law and economic matters the parties reached a satisfactory conflict 
regulation.71 Therefore, as Colomer argues, the agreement did not start as soon as the 
Franco died; instead it began with the rational decisions conditioned on the distribution 
of seats in the parliament following the first elections during the constituent process72. 
Therefore the party needed to seek coalition alternatives in order to realize the adoption 
of the new democratic constitution, the recognition of autonomous communities and the 
“Moncloa Pact”73 which was largely related to economic matters. In the pre-election 
period, the reformists within the government had preferred to cooperate with the 
continuists rather than the rupturist democratic opposition. Hence, the motive of the 
cooperation lied in the power distribution in the decision-making organ, rather than the 
enthusiasm for cooperation in order to democratize the modern Spain. Therefore the 
reformists of the government accepted the new constitutions which would be widely 
accepted in the new Cortes rather than their limited constitution proposal. The majority 
of the parties in the Cortes agreed on a new decentralization or creation of the 
“autonomous communities” and Moncloa Agreements in economic policies. In this 
process the rupturists who sought a democratic system without restrictions could be 
successful as a result of the power distributions in the Cortes. These concessions of the 
Suarez government as a result of the specific number of deputies obtained by each 
group made Suarez appear as the “traitor” according to the continuists. Suarez’s 
agreements with different opposition groups actually violated the pacts and consent 
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between the continuists Francoists.74 The proposal for the constitution was approved 
almost unanimously in Cortes and by a referendum of 87.8 percent of the voters 
approved, 32.3 percent abstaining. The parliamentary and municipal elections in the 
spring of 1979 installed the new regime. 
Nevertheless, many problems existed for the consolidation of democracy even 
after the elections and pacts. These problems were the political violence and the role of 
armed forces as a counter force, the international economic crisis in the 70s and the 
ongoing regional problems. The number of deaths caused by ETA’s actions continued 
to constitute an important number after the elections too. The concessions by the UCD 
which satisfied most of the nationalist groups in the Basque country, included the 
creation of a Basque police force and the restoration of the prior economic agreements 
according to which the Basque regional authority was obliged to collect and inspect all 
taxes and to retain for itself 67 percent of all revenues raised in the region in 1981. 
These concessions reduced the amount of the political violence. However, the 
concessions made to the Basque region triggered the armed forces and they attempted 
three coups in February and June 1981 and October 1982.75 The officers responsible for 
these attempts, Tejero and Milans del Bosch, were sentenced to prison for around thirty 
years. The harshness of these penalties was exceptional when compared to similar 
attempts in different states.76 Even though these coup attempts failed thanks to the 
King’s resistance supported by opposing factions within the army, the UCE and PSOE 
reached an agreement on an Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy 
Process, which would enforce restrictions in the autonomy of the Basque and Catalan 
regions.77 Spanish democracy, despite the existence of these problems and threats, 
experienced its new democratic elections in 1982 when the PSOE gained the majority of 
the votes and the democratic system in Spain continued to struggle with its internal 
problems afterwards.  
 
 
                                                 
74. Colomer, “Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way”, 1294. 
75. Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 58-9. 
76. Samuel Huntington, Üçüncü Dalga Yirminci Yüzyıl Sonlarında Demokratlaşma 
(Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century), translated by Ergun 
Özbudun (Ankara: Ofset Fotomat, 2002), 229. 
77. Gunther, “Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain”, 58-9. 
 25
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Transition to Democracy in Turkey in 1980s 
 
 
The experience of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in the 1980s 
marks the second major transition of the Turkish Republic. The first one was the 
transition from the charismatic early Republic under the founders, Atatürk and İsmet 
İnönü, to the post-traditional Republic. The transition in 1980s marked a shift from this 
post-traditionalism towards liberal modernism. However, the adoption of liberal 
democracy in Turkey was more challenging than was the case in the first transition. 78 
Turkey’s experience with the multiparty electoral system dates back to 1950. Prior 
to Demokrat Parti's (Democrat Party - DP) entry into the political system in 1946, 
several attempts with the intention of establishing opposition parties ended with 
absolute failure.79 Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party - CHP) ruled 
Turkey from 1923 to 1950 without any rival challenging its power. The first chief 
challenge to CHP’s rule was DP. DP gained the majority of the votes in the 1950 
elections.80 However, the establishment of opposition parties and the transformation of 
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the single party system into a multiparty system fell short of consolidating the Turkish 
democracy. During the multiparty system, Turkish democratization has been interrupted 
several times by military interventions of various sorts. The first such intervention on 
May 27, 1960 led to a military rule for a year. Turkish politics has been under the 
scrutiny of the military since this very first intervention.81 The second intervention on 
March 12, 1971 was quite moderate in comparison and was realized by a memorandum 
which indicated the discontent of the Turkish army from political developments. Rather 
than a military rule, constitutional arrangements were sufficient to keep the military 
content. The third intervention of the military on September 12, 1980 became the largest 
involvement of the military in civilians lives, lasting for a record three years from 1980 
to 1983. Overall, all of these military interventions were followed by a democratic 
revitalization of electoral politics.82 Recently, the repercussions of the 1980 coup have 
been widely debated by Turkish intellectuals.   
This chapter firstly deals with the factors leading to the political decay during the 
1970s. Although military rule was naturally an instrument restricting the individuals’ 
rights, its role in diminishing anarchy provided the passive consent of the Turkish 
society which had been suffering from political violence and an unstable economy. 
Secondly, this chapter will analyze the political actions during the military rule which 
had significant effects on the post-transition period. Having been influential in the 
drafting of the constitution, the military junta had thus shaped the social and political 
system in its aftermath. Thirdly, the transition to democracy process will be analyzed 
and its effects on the post-transition period will be evaluated. During the military rule, a 
new constitution was drafted and the head of the military intervention was named as the 
president of Turkey for the seven years following the military rule. Therefore, the 
effects of the transition process rigorously influenced the political atmosphere in the 
post-transition process.  
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3.1 Political Decay in 1970s 
 
By 1980, the increase in the level and scope of political violence that spread to 
most parts of the country caused Turks to discuss the possibility of a military 
intervention. In different segments of society, including some of the civilian political 
elites, the military solution received open or tacit support.83 Turkish military had 
already presented a memorandum in January 1980 regarding the failures in Turkish 
economy and political life. However, the military preferred to wait and see the Adalet 
Partisi (Justice Party - AP) government’s policies and the results of the newly adopted 
economic stabilization program.  Despite a clear warning from the military political 
parties failed to accommodate their interests and cooperate for the recovery of existing 
political and economic problems.84 Understanding the dynamics of the 1970s provides 
important clues for comprehending the reasons behind the military intervention in 1980. 
It is argued that, the collapse of the system was mainly caused by the inability of 
centrist forces in the 1970s to accommodate their interests and failures of the leadership 
of the parties to prevent the escalating crisis through cooperation. These failures 
eventually led to the polarization of the party system, the instability of the coalition 
governments, the parcelling of bureaucracy into warring camps and the polarization of 
social cleavages. The violence and terror was unavoidable following this political 
atmosphere.85 
The reasons of the intervention can be summarized by  increasing internal security 
problems, rising Kurdish secessionism, decay in the political system, a disastrous 
Turkish economy,populism and the rising threat of Islamic fundamentalism which 
ultimately caused a regime change in neighbouring Iran. 86  
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In the late 1970s, Turkey's economy was hit by the international crisis in world oil 
prices. Nearly all macroeconomic indicators revealed the trauma in the Turkish 
economy. In other words, civil governments were constantly failing to remedy the 
country’s economic crisis.87 Instead of long term economic policies, the parties in the 
government were striving to realize a relative increase during their short-term 
governments. Keyder adds that parliament’s inertia was not anymore able to silence the 
upheavals in society.88 Poor macroeconomic indicators alone are not sufficient to 
explain the reasons for military intervention, but they have an impact on rising unrest 
within society. 
 The major reason behind the inability of the government to adopt long-term 
policies instead of populist agendas was the intense competition between the major 
political parties, CHP and AP, for holding ministerial posts. It was widely held that the 
1961 constitution had played an important role in the fragmentation of the party system 
through its emphasis on the pluralist thrust encouraging minor parties; the proportional 
representation after 1961 which allowed minor parties to gain parliamentary seats; and 
the shifts of electoral behaviour.89 The Turkish party system was thus fragmented in the 
1970s. 
 The fragmented party system of the late 1970s revolved around two major 
parties- AP and CHP- and a few minor parties. AP, as successor of the DP, was placed 
in the centre-right. AP gained popular support from its skilful use of party patronage 
and manipulation of clientelist ties. Additionally, AP pursued the landed and business 
interests. The party’s appeal to religious and nationalist sentiments combined with its 
anti-Communist attitude provided the essential support to become a major party in the 
Turkish political arena.90 AP’s main rival, CHP, appealed to the mass through populist 
“social democracy” which addresses the workers, small peasants and urban marginal 
thereby defending the 1971 Constitution and the individual, associational and other civil 
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liberties guaranteed within the Constitution.91 Considering the division within the leftist 
groups itself, populist social democratic discourse appears as the most rational way to 
collect the majority of the votes in the competitive race between CHP and AP.92 Among 
the minor parties, two more powerful ones, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist 
Action Party -MHP) and Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party-MSP), were 
representing the extremist nationalism in the former and extremist fundamentalism in 
the latter. With regards to the Islamic fundamentalist, MSP was regarded as a marginal 
political party with a trivial threat to the secular regime. The reality of establishing an 
Islamic regime in contemporary Turkey seemed impossible to the intellectual elite.93 
Despite this accurate perspective depending on the data and developments until the 
early 1980s, the potentials of political Islam have been questioned in Turkish politics 
since 1980s. In 1970s, MSP was only empowered in Turkish politics as an alternative to 
become a coalition partner rather than from its ideological stance.  To sum up, the party 
system in 1970s was characterized by increasing party fragmentation and a sharpening 
of ideological confrontation and polarization. 
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Table 5. Turkish Parliamentary Election Results in 1973 and 1977 
Political Parties 1973 Elections 1977 Elections 
CHP 33,30 41,38 
AP 29,82 36,88 
MSP 11,80 8,56 
MHP 3,38 6,42 
Independent 2,83 2,50 
CGP 5,26 1,87 
DP 11,89 1,85 
TBP 1,14 0,39 
TİP - 0,14 
MP 0,58 - 
Source: TBMM, “Genel Seçim Sonuçları”, http: //www.tbmm.gov.tr/ 
develop/owa/genel_secimler, (accessed on May 10, 2007) 
 
Party names and Acronyms: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party- 
CHP), Adalet Partisi (Justice Party- AP), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation 
Party- MSP), Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party- MHP), 
Cumhuriyetçi Güven Party (Republican Trust Party- CGP), Demokrat Parti (Democrat 
Party- DP), Türkiye Birlik Partisi (Turkey Union Party- TBP), Türkiye İşçi Partisi 
(Turkey Workers’ Party- TİP), Millet Partisi (Millet Party- MP). 
 
The election results reiterated a party system with two major parties and several 
minor ones. Thus, electoral party competition was mainly polarized between two major 
parties. The ideological conflicts increased between these two parties as party elites 
preferred to win the competition at the expense of political stability. Even though the 
mass public of 1970s placed themselves near the centre of the party spectrum, the party 
elites and activists pronounced ideological polarization in order to strengthen their 
support. While AP opted for placing itself on the centre-right, CHP leader Ecevit’s “left 
of the centre” slogan gained public support. Despite this tendency towards the centre by 
slogans, this polarization could not be prevented. In conclusion, during the 1970s, the 
cooperation among the party elites seemed almost impossible; rather a bitter 
competition became a characteristic of politics. Two parties preferred to base their 
political arguments on the weakening of the other through “a mutual process of 
delegitimation”. This ideological polarization among the party elites was reflected to the 
mass level where various existing differences (e.g. religious, sectarian and ethnic) in 
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society were used as ideological warfare.94 Despite all of these destabilizing side-effects 
of the polarization, both parties continued blaming each other. This mutual secession 
empowered minor parties, since the only alternative available to reach a majority in 
parliament was forming a coalition with a major and a minor party. This tendency made 
the accommodation between AP and CHP almost impossible.95 In the Table 6, the 
governments between 1974 and 1980 (the year of military intervention) are shown. As 
observed, seven different governments in six years attempted to rule the country. 
Different forms of government existed from minority governments to coalition 
governments, nevertheless all of them failed to bring stability to the regime.96 
 As I explained above, neither the political nor the economic conditions of the 
country were at a desirable level. However, another factor was unavoidable for the 
military: political violence. The rising political violence necessitated, in other terms 
legitimized military intervention. Dodd reveals that “The military, as always in any 
country, was sensitive in the extreme to the use of force by others when it alone was 
supposed to have the monopoly of violence”97. 
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Table 6. The Governments of Turkey between 1974 and 1980 
Prime Minister Party(ies) in the government     Date 
Reasons of 
failure 
Ecevit (CHP) CHP and MSP 01.1974-11.1974 Disagreement 
between the 
coalition partners 
Irmak (Independent) Minority 
Government headed 
by a member of the 
Senate of Republic 
11.1974-03.1975 Vote of confidence 
was not given. 
Demirel (AP) AP, MHP, MSP and 
CGP 
03.1975-06.1977 1977 Elections 
Ecevit (CHP) CHP-minority 
government 
06.1977-07.1977 Vote of confidence 
was not given. 
Demirel (AP) AP-MSP-MHP 07.1977-01.1978 Vote of confidence 
was not given 
following a non-
confidence motion 
Ecevit (CHP) CHP 01.1978-11.1979 Ecevit’s resignation 
following the mid-
term elections 
Demirel (AP) AP-minority 
government 
11.1979-09.1980 Military 
Intervention 
Source: TBMM,“TBMM Hükümetleri”,  
Available at: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/hukumetler.htm, (accessed on 
May 12, 2007) 
Party names and acronyms: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party- 
CHP), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party- MSP), Adalet Partisi (Justice 
Party- AP), Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party- MHP), 
Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Trust Party- CGP). 
 
The political violence spread from universities to the streets. One course of 
violence occurred between the politicized groups or organizations like Devrimci İşçi 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (The Revolutionary Trade Unions - DİSK), Türk 
Öğretmenler Birliği Derneği (Turkish Teachers’ Association - TOBDER) and the forces 
of law and order. Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Nationalist Workers’ 
Union-MİSK) was also receiving support from the right wing. The right-left clashes in 
the streets had become widespread. In addition, as happened in Kahramanmaraş 
district, existing divisions within the society were politically exploited. Assassinations 
of political, military and police figures were equally worrying.98 Nevertheless, the 
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question remains as to why the military intervened on September 12th and not earlier, if 
political violence was indeed more important than the political void.99 
Here, I will not contest the arguments over the prevailing motive behind the 
military intervention. Possibly, the combination of these reasons caused the military 
intervention in September 1980.100 
As a result of prolonging rivalry and reluctance for cooperation among political 
elites, Turkish political and economic circumstances showed no glimmer of hope for 
recovery by the end of 1970s. The influence of military in the politics had already 
become a characteristic of the Turkish political scene since mid-nineteenth century. 
Therefore, a military intervention into politics, when the political process is entirely in 
crisis, would not surprise majority of the public. Nevertheless, neither Demirel nor 
Ecevit were expecting a coup d’etat. As Hale suggested, several factors made the 
political leaders confident enough for the difficulties of realizing a coup d’etat. These 
were the failures of the semi-military regime during 1971-73, and the success of civilian 
initiative over the military in the 1973 presidential election when Fahri Korutürk was 
elected instead of military-supported candidate Cemal Gürler. In addition, the leaders’ 
confidence relied on their role over the appointment of high-ranking commanders in the 
last decade during the prime ministry of both leaders.101 
Currently, even the harshest critiques of the 1980 intervention hardly deny the fact 
that the political violence had reached an unbearable level and any action ceasing this 
desperate situation would be acceptable. It still remains as a question whether the 
political parties in late 1970s could accommodate their interests in order to prevent the 
collapse of democracy and the adoption of authoritarian type of government. However, 
it is easily arguable that political parties have made less effort than they could. The 
deadlock in presidential elections is sufficient to prove the lack of conflict resolution 
measures undertaken between the parties. The reasons for this however are not under 
the scope of this study.  
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In addition to these conditions, several developments raised the tensions between 
the military and the government, thus pulled the trigger. Firstly, the number of the 
regions under martial law was increasing. The martial law was restricting the powers of 
the commanders. Because, according to the principle invoked by Ecevit martial law 
authority’s decisions also had to be approved by the government.102 The commanders, 
who were keen to stop anti-regime propaganda or to prevent violence, were not content. 
Secondly, the presidential election following the end of Korutürk’s term was 
deadlocked because of the rivalry between the CHP and AP for electing their favourite 
candidate. This deadlock was blocking the political activity of the parliament as well. 
Thirdly, MSP’s intention to inject religion into politics reached unavoidable limits for 
the military. MSP supporters’ disrespect to the national anthem in Konya  on 6th of 
September and their leader Erbakan’s slurring speech about the Victory Day of 
Independence War on 30th of August helped the military to expedite their plans. 103 
 
 
3.2 Military Rule: 1980-83 
 
Military intervention in politics was not a surprise for any segments of the Turkish 
society. Military had already been one of the important actors of Turkish politics and 
had acted as the guardian of the Republican regime since the establishment in 1923. In 
addition, political experience in Turkey included military’s active role in politics. For 
some, military interventions should be categorized as “moderating coups” where 
military abstains from establishing a long-standing bureaucratic-authoritarian regime.104 
Other perceive the military interventions as an obstacle for democratic consolidation 
since it pursues the interests of a certain class. Yet, a recent study reveals that the latter 
argument is not widespread among the Turkish people.105 World Value Survey also 
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supports that argument and indicate that Turkish people, in general, have high 
confidence in their armed forces. The percentage of the Turks who are confident in their 
armed forces never remained below 80 percent since 1990. 106  This high confidence in 
the armed forces and civilians’ continuing rivalry leading to political decay before 1980 
facilitated the military to intervene. Differing than the Western European States, the 
image of Turkish Military as the pioneer of modernisation force since late 19th century 
provides a dilemma for public opinion in Turkey. However, it is fair to admit that 
Turkish Political Culture paves the way for military to intervene into politics.  
As I mentioned earlier, the priority concern of the military rule was the 
suppression of the escalating political violence in the country. Its second concern was 
founding a new political system where the mistakes of the past would not be repeated. 
This finding proves that the military desired a fundamental restructuring of the Turkish 
political system instead of applying partial measures.107 In addition to these two 
concerns, economic conditions of the country were in desperate need of long-term 
economic policies.    
The composition of the Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council-
MGK108) was changed in favour of the military. MGK was comprised of six members 
including Chief of Staff General Evren (as the chairman) and formerly Commander of 
the Land Forces General Saltik (as the Secretary) and commanders of the army, navy, 
airforce and gendarmerie. MGK would hold the executive and legislative powers.  All 
the activities of the political parties,and two trade unions (DİSK and MİSK) were 
suspended. The political party leaders were taken into custody in a military camp. 
In the initial days of intervention, MGK promised a transition to democracy based 
on secularism, freedom and social rights, taking into account the rights and freedoms of 
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the people. Moreover, the military promised drafting a Constitution and an Election 
Law in alignment with democratic principles.109 In alignment with Turkish foreign 
policy, the junta government’s commitment to stay within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was reassured.  Martial law was extended from twenty to sixty-
seven provinces.  The Constitutional Order Law aimed at a reduction in the number of 
violence experienced in the streets.110 The leaders of three political party leaders 
including Ecevit (CHP), Demirel (AP) and Erbakan (MSP) were taken into custody in a 
military camp in Gelibolu. In order to re-establish the impartiality of a politicized 
bureaucracy, wide administrative and penal punishments were applied to  civil 
servants.111 In addition to the MGK, twenty-six members cabinet was appointed under 
the prime ministry of Bülend Ulusu, a former admiral. Other than Ulusu, four other 
military appointees existed in the cabinet including the Ministry of Interior, Selahattin 
Çetiner. Turgut Özal participated in the cabinet as the Minister of State and 
Economy.112 Özal was the chief economic advisor of Demirel before the military 
intervention. His appointment indicated that the generals entrusted economic 
policymaking to the principal architect of the stabilization program which was initated 
by the AP government with the active support and cooperation of the International 
Monetary Fund(IMF) in January 1980. This stabilization program rejected the economic 
growth strategy pursued by the populist governments of the 1960s and the 1970s which 
were driven byimport-substituting industrialization policies. Instead, Özal aimed at 
adjusting the economy to market-oriented measures to reach international 
competitiveness. The new economic policies brought considerable progress within a 
year. The political context where little room for opposition to the policies adopted by 
the government paved the way for the determined implementation of the economic plan. 
113 Dodd defines the military as “not etatist” because of their adoption of neo-liberal 
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economic policies led by Özal and interpretes the policy as a part of “seperating 
economy from politics” .114 
The numbers of deaths from political violence declined in a relatively short time 
as a result of the anti-terrorist campaign including mass arrests and extensive use of 
Martial Law by the military. The trials held against the major political players were 
criticized by international organizations as well as the European left.115 In addition to 
these precautions, the military junta applied strict control over radio and television 
broadcasts.  The right to appeal was made more complicated. The political conflicts of 
1970s had arisen in universities. Thus, the MGK also applied strict control over 
universities. For example, the Higher Education Council was established to assert 
government’s influence over universities. The legislation of the Council included many 
regulations from appointment of the rectors by the Head of State, prohibition of the 
membership of students and staff in political parties, and compulsory teaching services 
in less developed areas. The Council was empowered to supervise the administration of 
the universities. In order to de-politicize bureaucracy, the number of high ranking 
officials in each ministry was restricted. This would allow establishing a more 
satisfactory long-term control of bureaucracy. The in-take of the personnel was 
organized only by the State Personnel Council.116  
Therefore, the military rule was successful to reach its primary objectives. The 
incidents of political violence diminished very rapidly and the economic recovery plan 
bared its fruits within a short time. The success of the military rule was mainly 
determined by its distinctive characteristic in centralizing the decision-making structure. 
Differing from earlier example of military rule in 1960, the military operated according 
to its hierarchical structure. The executive organ, MGK, was freed from the civilian 
members and its authority has been strengthened by laws which restrict political 
opposition. Secondly, the power was centralized; there was no disagreement within the 
military. Even the top level commanders agreed not to make separate statements on 
vital issues.  Thirdly, Ulusu government and the MGK were in total agreement.117 
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Possibly, the difference between the two military rules was related to the severity of the 
problems prior to the coups. The conditions in the 1970s were far more destabilizing 
than the conditions which led to the 1960 coup or the 1971 intervention. Therefore 
military felt it necessary to infiltrate almost every segment of society. 118 
Following those achievements stated above, the remaining objective of the 
military was the restructuring of the political system. That objective would be realized 
through a new constitution and additional laws pertaining to political participation.  
 
3.3 1982 Constitution Making Process 
 
As Evren promised in the early announcement of the military rule, the transition to 
democratic rule commenced as soon as political and economical stability were secured. 
Danışma Meclisi (National Consultative Assembly - DM) was established primarily for 
drafting a constitution, and in the meantime for performing necessary legislative 
functions.119 The composition of DM was mainly determined by the MGK’s approval. 
Therefore, it was far from being a representative parliament.  
 
Table 7. Composition of DM in Turkey 
# of members How were they elected? Profile 
120 members MGK Selected from the list 
prepared by the provincial 
governors 
Average Age: 54 
 
Heavily Representative of 
the Professions  
 
Lacking in Controversial 
figures 
40 members  Selected by the MGK 
directly 
 Source: Kurucu Meclis Hakkında Kanun (Law on National Consultative 
Assembly): Code 2485 was adopted on June 29th 1981 
 
MGK and DM constituted the Constituent Assembly which was primarily in 
charge of drafting the new constitution.120 
There was a general feeling among the military officers that the 1961 constitution 
which enforces  political pluralism was not responding to real demands of the Turkish 
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people, instead was contributing to the escalation of crises in the country. The 1982 
Constitution was drafted by the Constituent Assembly and has been criticized since its 
coming into effect. Turkey’s constitution making process in 1980-83 constitute an 
example of “reform type” where the new constitution is drafted by the unrepresentative 
assembly.121 Özbudun argues that the politics of constitution making during the 
transition process provide findings in order to understand the character of the transition 
process and explains the level of stability in the post-transition process.122 
Procedurally, a committee selected by the Constituent Assembly drafted the 1982 
Constitution.123 The draft was open to discussion but propaganda was strictly 
prohibited. Different groups ranging from universities to workers’ union Türk-İş 
(Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Turkish Trade Union Confederation) and 
Türk İşveren Sendikası Konfederasyonu (Turkish Employer Syndicate Confederation-
TİSK) presented their views on the first draft. The procedure of constitution-making 
was as follows: The draft was first subject to amendments of DM and later to the 
revision of the MGK. Finally, the constitution had to be approved by a referendum.  
As explained in more detail above, the members of the DM were not directly 
elected, rather appointed by the MGK. On the contrary, DM had no authority over the 
appointment of MGK members.124 According to the law, members of the former 
political parties were prohibited to become members of the DM. As the political party 
members were dismissed, the majority of the members of the DM have been selected 
from among the bureaucrats. MGK had the authority to amend or veto the articles 
proposed by the DM. The amendments of the MGK would be adopted without a second 
reading by DM. The articles were amended by the MGK members. The adoption of the 
constitution was conditioned to a referendum, however the procedure following a 
possible “no” vote in the referendum was not mentioned.125 It is still a question whether 
the military rule would lead to an uncertain date following a possible “no” vote, but it 
would not be irrational to argue so. According to a provisional article of the 
constitution, the head of the MGK would be appointed as the new president for the next 
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seven years.126 Prior to the referendum a law obligating the people to vote was also 
passed in order to provide the popular legitimacy for the constitution. The opposition to 
Evren’s speech in favour of the constitution was also not allowed. Eventually, the 
referendum was held on November 7th 1982. 91.37% of the voters approved the 
constitution. Only in Southeast Turkey, the “no” votes were relatively higher.127  
The referendum was expected to provide popular legitimacy for the constitution; 
but the restrictions on the propaganda against the constitution raised doubts over the 
constitution’s legitimacy. Özbudun also argues that the 1982 constitution involves 
articles challenging the democratic consolidation in Turkey. In particular, the articles of 
the constitution empowering the president implied that the influence of the MGK would 
continue during the presidency of General Evren. In addition, a provisional article of the 
constitution banned the existing political parties and their members prior to 1980 
intervention for 5 to 10 years. The prominent members of the military rule and their 
decisions were granted judiciary exemptions. 128  
Consequently, a new Constitution was made under the substantial influence by the 
military through its presence within the MGK, and their strengthened advisory power 
over the constitution making process. The end result, the 1982 Constitution, brought a 
transition to democracy process as promised in advance, but with certain restrictions in 
political participation, and with a new president which would challenge the elected 
governments during the initial years of the transition. The 1982 Constitution attempted 
to establish institutional pluralism, albeit not as extensive as 1961. In order to decrease 
the number of categories of state elites, the Constitution strengthened presidency and 
MGK at the expense of the powers of the higher courts and the autonomy of the 
universities. Another significant development was the changing perception of 
Atatürkism paving the way for further scope for politics. 129 
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3.4 The New Political System 
 
According to the new constitution, the strengthened power of the president 
founded a two-tiered regime where there is “a state divorced from politics and a 
depoliticized society”.130 Isolating society from politics was a political choice of the 
military. The military wished to prevent politicization of associations. They also 
expected to de-politicize the bureaucracy and put it under the care of the strong 
president.131 At the opening day of DM, Evren clearly stated that he was in favour of 
strengthening the presidential powers to a level more than merely signing decrees.132 
Dodd assumes that a two-tiered regime with a strong president as the “representative of 
the state” and an elected prime minister would ensure the co-existence of modernism 
and “traditionalism”, and therefore maintain the order and security.133 The President 
was provided excessive executive, legislative and judiciary powers. These powers 
included appointment of the cabinet and the Chief of Staff, heading MGK, representing 
the Commander in Chief. The president also was given the responsibility to guard the 
Constitution by a strengthened veto power. He held the option to submit the 
Constitutional amendments to referendum when the Assembly insists against his 
objections. In addition, the appointment of the members of Constitutional Court, the 
Council of State, the Military Court of Cassation, the Supreme Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors and the High Court of Appeal were the important judiciary responsibilities 
of the President. The Appointment of Higher Educational Council and State 
Supervisory Commission were also included in the list of President’s tasks.134 
Initially, there have been several restrictions in the freedom of expression and on 
the social and economic rights and duties. The restrictions in freedom of expression was 
justified by the purpose of “protecting youth from harmful currents of thought and for 
preventing the dissemination of false and untimely news which would adversely affect 
the economic life.”135 The right to assemble and demonstrations of public associations 
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and trade unions were also restricted. The unions’ linkages with the political parties 
were prevented. None of them, could support or be supported by political parties. 136  
To sum up, the universities were supervised, the political parties were restricted to 
form auxiliary branches, civil society including the university faculty member and trade 
union members were disengaged from politics, and the publications were only 
published under the permission of the government. Political Parties were closed and 
new party and election laws were designed to favour the centrist parties.137 The Political 
Party Law, adopted in March 1983, banned political parties and their former leaders in 
the 1970s. According to these laws, the opening of new parties was conditioned to the 
approval of the founders of the party by the MGK. With the help of the martial law 
throughout the country, the MGK realized strict control over political activity. 
Competitive election campaigns in the elections among the political parties before the 
1980 military intervention were not observed prior to November 1983 elections.138 The 
Electoral Law adopted in June 1983 included thresholds. One of them was the country 
threshold of ten-percentage which implies that only the parties which gained more than 
ten-percent of the votes would have members in the parliament. The other threshold was 
the constituency threshold.139 The main rationale behind the electoral law was 
eliminating the minor parties which disturbed the stability of the coalition governments 
in the pre-1980 period. The military aimed to leave the political system to two major 
parties closer to center so that the stability would be reached. Other than the political 
party law and the electoral law, the Law on Pacts, Strikes and Lock-out and Syndicates 
Law were widely criticized as including restrictions on political participation in the 
post-1983 period.140 The motive behind strengthened presidential powers and restricted 
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political participation was retaining military’s political influence after an eventual 
transition to electoral politics.141 
Between March 1983 and November 1983 fifteen parties were established. Two of 
them, Sosyal Demokrat Parti (Social Democrat Party - SODEP) and Doğru Yol Partisi 
(True Path Party - DYP), were perceived by the military as the successors of the CHP 
and AP, respectively. Therefore, the military excluded these parties from the 
competitive elections race by rejecting to approve their founders. Overall, MGK 
allowed only three of the fifteen parties to enter the elections. Over 700 candidates for 
members of parliament were dismissed by the MGK. Another restriction during the 
election propaganda period was restriction of criticizing the MGK’s actions during the 
military rule. The extended martial law also allowed MGK to monitor the political 
activity very closely. 142 
Finally, only three parties participated in the elections. These parties were: 
Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party - MDP) led by Turgut 
Sunalp-former general, Halkçı Parti (Populist Party) led by Necdet Calp-former 
member of CHP and Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party - ANAP) led by Turgut Özal- 
the minister of state in the early years of junta government.  MDP was claimed to 
represent the centre right and was favoured by the armed forces. HP was supposed to 
form a loyal opposition as a centre-left party. In the meantime, ANAP espoused a 
commitment to liberal economic policies and conservative cultural values.  
Two days prior the elections, President Evren implied his support for the NDP 
through a TV speech where he exactly stated his opinion on the coming elections. Evren 
invited the voters to vote for the party which will continue the success of MGK and will 
prevent Turkey to fall into anarchy as it happened before the MGK government. 143 The 
election resulted with the ANAP’s comfortable win. Despite the armed forces’ unease 
and Evren’s implication in favour of the Sunalp’s MDP, the authority of government 
transferred from soldiers to civilians. Özal government was formulated and obtained 
vote of confidence on December 24th of 1983.  
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Table 8. Turkish Parliamentary Election Results in 1983 
Parties Votes Seats 
ANAP 45.1 211 
HP 30.5 117 
MDP 23.3 71 
Independents 1.1 - 
Source:Konrad Adenauer Foundation, “1983 Genel Seçim Sonuçları”, at: 
http://www.konrad.org.tr/secim/ayrinti.php?yil_id=9 (accessed on June 6, 2007) 
Party names and acronyms: Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party- ANAP), Halkçı 
Parti (Populist Party – HP), Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party 
– MDP). 
To sum up, the generals orchestrated the initial phase of the political liberalization. 
Turkish politics, at least, returned to a semi-competitive electoral process. The outcome 
of the elections was different than the military’s expectation. The party which was 
identified with the military, MDP, became the third party.  On the other hand, ANAP, as 
the most distant party from the military among the existing ones in the elections, 
received the highest percentage of the votes. This electoral result gave support for Özal 
to lessen the military’s influence over the civilian cabinet during the ANAP 
government.  
Even though the military rule was replaced with an elected cabinet, the 
consolidation of democracy required more than a semi-competitive election. However, 
Özal at least had a comfortable majority in the parliament that provided him with the 
opportunity to establish a single party cabinet without seeking a coalition partner. 
ANAP had already incorporated elements of a centre-right coalition. Özal’s party was a 
mixture of three rightist groups of the 1970s: the conservative liberals, Islamists and the 
radical nationalists.144 During Özal’s government between 1983 and 1987, Turkey 
enjoyed an intermediary phase where Turkish politics moved from authoritarian rule 
toward gradual political opening accompanied by the strengthening of civil society by 
political liberalization.145 Özal skilfully used a calm discourse against the military and 
president. Rather than vital issues, he preferred to make public speeches on economic 
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issues, where military was already comfortable with civilians’ primacy.146 Furthermore, 
Özal continued the economic stabilization and liberalization policies initiated in the 
early 1980s thanks to the strong parliamentary support for his government. Özal 
ambitious economic policy based on economic growth through export-promotion 
received much governmental emphasis and support.147 The expansion of Turkey’s 
exports contributed to the maintenance of growth rates. Özal’s economic policies 
increased foreign investment in Turkey and improved the country’s economic 
infrastructure. However, his attitude toward technocratic, centralized and personalized 
policy-making caused unrest within the bureaucratic echelons. They responded with 
delaying tactics, excessive emphasis on legal measures, and insistence on established 
bureaucratic procedures.148 Although the Özal government was weakened as a result of 
this clash between the political elites appointed by Özal and the statist elites within the 
bureaucracy, this process contributed to the freeing of the former from the supervision 
of the latter. 149 
Especially absence of SODEP and DYP in the elections raised doubts over the 
representative character of the new parliament. Therefore, the municipality elections in 
1984 would indicate the actual popular support for the government. The importance of 
these municipality elections was the legal participation of SODEP and DYP in the 
elections. Özal’s ANAP won the elections while SODEP came second, and DYP third. 
The election results had important implications for the political parties Firstly; the 
results indicated that support for ANAP did not diminish despite another centre-right 
party’s (DYP) participation in the elections.150 Secondly, even though the prominent 
leaders of former political parties were suspended, SODEP and DYP offered an 
organizational link with the precoup parties, CHP and AP respectively. Thirdly, since 
MDP and HP gained less than 10 percent of the votes in the municipality elections, they 
realized that their existence contributed little to the competitive party system and the 
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military’s intentions on establishing two centre parties in accordance with their values. 
Hence, HP opted for merging with SODEP, and they changed their name as Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democrat Populist Party-SHP). On the other hand, 
former CHP leader Ecevit appeared again in politics by a new party Demokratik Sol 
Parti (Democratic Left Party-DSP). He was banned from political activities; therefore 
his wife head the party. As expected he was closely affiliated with the party just as 
Demirel was with DYP. The affiliations of those old leaders with these parties proved 
that the banning of political leaders would not guarantee their full exemption from the 
political system. In May 1987, the government proposed constitutional amendments 
including the lifting of the provisional ban in the 1982 constitution which suspends the 
leaders of the precoup political parties.151 The Parliament adopted the resolution that  
lifting political bans would be decided by a referendum. The referendum results brought 
a slight victory in favour of political liberalization. (50.2 % voted in favour, 49.8 
against). Immediately after the referendum, Ecevit and Demirel became the heads of the 
DSP and DYP respectively.152 Özal, believing that the 49.8 of the votes implied support 
for his party, declared early elections to be held in November 1987.  
Table 9: Turkish Parliamentary Election Results of 1987 
Parties Percentage Votes Seats 
ANAP 36.3 292 
SHP 24.8 99 
DYP 19.1 59 
DSP 8.5 - 
RP 7.17 - 
MÇP 2.93 - 
Independents 0.37 - 
Source: TBMM, “1987 Genel Seçimleri”, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/genel_secimler.genel_secimler  (accessed on June 
20, 2007) 
Party names and acronyms: Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party – ANAP), Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democrat Populist Party – SHP), Doğru Yol Partisi 
(True Path Party – DYP), Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party – DSP), Refah 
Partisi (Welfare Party - RP), Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (National Work Party - MÇP). 
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The result of the election, depicted in Table 9, proves that despite a declining trend 
in the support for party; ANAP was once more able to gain the majority of the seats in 
the parliament. This majority was sufficient enough for Özal to establish a single party 
cabinet for the second time consecutively. ANAP’s second term in the government was 
challenged by economic difficulties, particularly the rising inflation and unemployment 
rates. The balance between the rich and the poor shifted in favour of the former. ANAP 
failed to respond to the inflation problem, but instead applied populist economic 
policies by increasing public expenditures before the referendum and the national 
elections in 1987.153  As the elections and referendums became more frequent, the 
“economic policies became less coherent, macroeconomic instability increased, and a 
number of structural adjustment measures either stalled or reversed.”154 Although 
ANAP continued in the footsteps of the AP, it was a new entity emerged in 1983. 
Therefore, the party faced a “problem of constituting and subsequently consolidating a 
solid electoral base.”155 The results of the municipality elections in 1988 proved that 
ANAP was losing countrywide support. ANAP could only become the third party in the 
elections following SHP and DYP.156 The declining popular support caused division of 
the centre-right coalition within ANAP itself. The discontent between the liberal and 
conservative wings of the party has become visible by 1988.157 The conservative wing 
of the party was informed by an explicit Islamic ideology. The differences between 
these wings were not only political but also economical. The liberals wished to proceed 
with the program of economic liberalization while at the same time maintaining 
monetary and fiscal discipline. On the other hand, conservatives favoured using 
discretionary powers of the state as an instrument to broaden the electoral base of the 
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party.158  Evren’s term would end in 1989, and Özal elected as the new president by the 
parliament in which majority of the seats were held by ANAP. Özal delegated the 
authority of establishing a new cabinet to his former Interior Minister, Yıldırım Aktuna. 
However, thanks to the excessive political power granted to the President in Turkey, 
Özal acted as an active and influential president during his presidency. Later, Aktuna 
was replaced by Mesut Yılmaz, a member of ANAP’s liberal wing in party congress in 
1991.159 Mesut Yılmaz decided to resort to early elections to gain power to implement 
his strict economic policies. Therefore early elections were held in October 1991. The 
results of the elections were as follows:  
Table 10. Turkish Parliamentary Election Results of 1991 
Parties Votes Seats 
DYP 27,03 179 
ANAP 24,01 112 
SHP 20,75 91 
RP 16,88 61 
DSP 10,75 7 
SP  0,44 - 
Independents 0,13 - 
Source: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, “1991 Genel Seçimleri” 
http://www.konrad.org.tr/secim/ayrinti.php?yil_id=11 (accessed on July 2, 2007) 
 
Party names and acronyms: Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party – DYP), Anavatan 
Partisi (Motherland Party – ANAP), Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democrat 
Populist Party – SHP), Refah Partisi (Welfare Party - RP),  Demokratik Sol Parti 
(Democratic Left Party – DSP), Sosyalist Parti (Socialist Party - SP). 
  
None of the parties gained the majority of the seats in the parliament to form a 
single party government. DYP and SHP formed the coalition after intense negotiations. 
Following Özal’s sudden death in April 1993, the seat of the presidency was a matter of 
debate again. Demirel was elected as the new president. Instead of him, Tansu Çiller 
was elected as the new head of DYP. Demirel’s presidency and Mrs. Çiller’s prime 
ministry signal certain changes in the Turkish political milieu. Demirel, a politician who 
has been overthrown by two military interventions in 1971 and 1980, became the 
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president of the state thus the commander-in-chief of the military. Hale defines this 
change as one of the signs of civilianisation within the regime. On the other hand, the 
prime ministry under Çiller as a Western and liberal woman was a turning point in a 
Muslim country.160 During all of these governments formed by ANAP, SHP and DYP, 
the political elites aimed at further democratizing the regime by decreasing the role of 
the civil bureaucracy, the president and the military. The power of the bureaucracy was 
curbed by economic liberalization, privatization and decentralization.161 
Another significant shift from the statist values was observed in Turkish foreign 
policy making. The Turkish foreign policy was conducted by the statist elites within the 
bureaucracy prior to Özal’s government. Özal sustained this trend in the initial years of 
the transition. He stayed distant with President Evren who willingly exerted influence 
over the foreign and security policies.  Rather, Özal was concentrating on economic 
policies. As I explained above, Özal appointed technocrats in economic policies. He 
preferred to use the same strategy to empower the role of civilians in the foreign 
ministry. Therefore he appointed a new generation of younger, educated technocrats 
who were familiar with his dynamic and reformist approach. Moreover, Özal was 
skilled at adjusting the level of tensions between his government and the military. His 
rejection of the military’s candidate as the new chief of staff, in 1987, indicated his 
ability to assert the primacy of civilian control in politics. Later, Özal avoided the chief 
of staff in crucial diplomatic meetings with the chiefs of the other state. Then CGS, 
Necip Torumtay, had nothing to do but resign after Özal’s behaviour. These events 
proved that Özal’s overriding personal approach in Turkish foreign policy was being 
consolidated. When Özal lost his political power, he bequeathed a legacy of weakened 
foreign ministry which would lead to a weakening of Turkish foreign policy by the mid 
1990s. Thus, as a result of the power vacuum within the foreign affairs, the military 
started to become more influential again by the mid-1990s. MGK’s advisory powers 
were helping the military to influence the foreign policy. In short, despite initial 
cautious behaviour of the Özal against the president, he gradually exerted civilians’ 
primacy in foreign policy making after 1987. 162  
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3.5 A Brief Assessment of Transition to Democracy in Turkey 
 
Transition to democracy in 1980s, started a new era in Turkish politics. Heper 
argues that before 1980 “the fate of the transition to democracy in Turkey rested upon 
the outcome of the conflict between the statist elites and the populist political elites. 
Whereas the former considered democracy as an end in itself- as a technique to find the 
best solution for the problems the country faced- and argued that Atatürkism should 
become the sole source for public policies, the latter tried to substitute national will for 
Atatürkism.”163 Heper continues that this struggle appeared in the three military 
interventions where the statist solution prevailed or in the purely political formula 
where democracy was debilitated. Each solution attempted to establish a different sort 
of institutional monism in which either a self-appointed guardian or anti-statist, populist 
political elites controlled the centre.164 Rustow sees the post-1983 developments as 
releasing unprecedented social and political forces, including the rise of a new business 
class and a concerted attack on the entrenched etatist bureaucracy.165  Birtek argues that 
Turkish political institutions were on the verge of a possible  radical restructuration that 
could lead to a new consensus, a new political grammar, and a new political 
discourse.166 By the end of the transition, a reasonable question could be raised as to 
whether a party-dominated democracy working in the absence of a public body, (which 
used to be the Atatürkist bureaucracy), could effectively protect public interest. 167 The 
gradual replacement of state elites with political elites eventually contributed to the 
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development toward an autonomous civil-society including Islamists, liberals, the new 
left, women etc. 168 
Overall by the early 1990s, the institutional monism had been largely eroded; 
however, the expected level of pluralism was still not reached. 
The problems of democratic consolidation remain and attract attention of 
numerous intellectuals, the international organisations and human rights activists. 
Özbudun argues that several factors including the elements of the 1982 Constitution, the 
role of the military, the party system and recently Political Islam and Kurdish 
Nationalism challenge the democratic consolidation in Turkey.169 
 Therefore, O’Donnell’s notion of “two transitions” is particularly useful for 
properly comprehending Turkish democracy since 1980s. He states that  
 
“the first is the transition from the previous authoritarian regime to 
the installation of a democratic government. The second transition 
is from this government to the consolidation of democracy, or, in 
other words, to the effective functioning of a democratic 
regime….The second transition will not be any less arduous nor 
any less lengthy; the paths that lead from a democratic government 
to a democratic regime are uncertain and complex, and the 
possibilities of authoritarian regression are numerous.”170 
 
Apparently, Turkish democracy could complete the first but the second transition. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey is struggling between democratic 
challenges from within the society and openings for democracy with unsteady pace in 
purpose of reaching a full-fledged liberal democracy.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Role of the Military in Transition to Democracy in Spain 
 
 
In Chapter 2, I analyzed the transition to democracy in Spain by giving emphasis 
to both the sequential developments and the role of various institutions and actors 
during the process. As I mentioned, the transition in Spain sets a precedent in transition 
to democracy in 1980s with the level of agreement among the influential parties. In this 
milieu, the armed forces, as an important pillar of the Francoist society, found itself in a 
position where they had little room to maneuver. The military ultimately consented to 
the changes during the transition even though it voiced its firm preferences in advance. 
Those preferences were not open to discussion for the armed forces before the 
transition. However, the outcome of the transition was clearly unexpected by the bulk of 
the military officers.  
As most of the researchers of civil-military relations complain, studying military 
as a component together with the other democratic institutions has been neglected by 
scholars. Stepan argues that the military is probably “the least studied of the factors 
involved in new democratic movements.”171 While the study of military was neglected 
within the theoretical approaches as a whole, it is not surprising to encounter only few 
studies focusing specifically on the role of military in the Spain’s transition to 
democracy, where military’s role was at a very low level because of the some important 
developments, especially the coalescence of the civilians.172 Nevertheless, in the last 
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couple of decades different developments in Southern European and Latin American 
states indicated that the behavior of the militaries is not monolithic and it has significant 
influence over the transition to democracy. This chapter examines the role of the 
military in the Spanish transition to democracy during the late 1970s.  
 
 
4.1 The Armed Forces in Franco’s Spain: 
 
When the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s ended with the success of General 
Franco-led military and Catholic Church coalition, the features of the new political 
system were shaped in accordance with the winner side’s preferences and their post-
Civil War influence.173 Later, the Francoist Spain was ruled by a three-pillared structure 
with military, the Falangists and the Catholic Church. The charismatic leadership of 
Franco, the caudillo, was the essential figure for the cohabitation of these actors during 
his reign. By the end of the regime, this coalition was dissolved by the Catholic 
Church’s abstention as explained in the previous chapters of this study. However, the 
cooperation of these institutions during the Civil War let them to voice their preferences 
in the Francoist political system. The detailed study of this three-pillared structure or the 
role of each of the institutions in the society is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Nevertheless, the role of the military and the tools empowering its influence over the 
politics and the society deserve attention to understand the military’s preferences and 
strategies during the transition era.  
The Spanish military had already been involved in politics since the 19th century 
when the political convulsions wracked the country of Spain.174 The country’s political 
history in 19th century involves civil wars and numerous colonial confrontations where 
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military intervened according to its self-assumed roles such as guarding the state from 
internal conflicts and external enemies. Spanish politics has experienced 30 coups since 
1850s.175 The military appeared as strong man in the national life of Spaniards with its 
roles during the country’s crises.176 Not surprisingly, the success of General Franco 
paved the way for the military to become one of the dominant forces in the Spanish 
politics following the Civil War. The Falange, as the single party, was an influential 
actor as well. However, differing from other dictatorships, the Spanish politics have 
never allowed the Falangists to dominate politics. Rather, the power rested in the 
government or the Council of Ministers in other terms.177 In the composition of the 
Council of Ministers, the military officers, the politicians and the technocrats were the 
three main categories. Especially in the initial years of the regime the number of the 
military officers was higher than the others, which decreased in the later periods and 
technocrats replaced them in their expertise posts.178 Military’s influence in the state 
was empowered by the appointments in the public administration which allowed 
dramatic increase in the number of bureaucrats compared with army personnel. This 
bureaucratic participation also affected the academic literature where most of the studies 
examined the Spanish military as a bureaucratic institution.179  In addition to the 
expansion in bureaucracy the occupational inheritance180 allowed independence on the 
organizational level to the military.181 By the help of these potentials, the military 
played an important role for the Spanish society in two ways; the budgetary and 
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normative.182 Military jurisdiction and compulsory military service empowered the 
normative role. The military was also allocated a large portion of the budget during the 
Franco’s rule. The percentage of the military spending on the overall national budget 
never remained below 20%.183 Military’s proportion in the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was in reality lower than the neighboring European Countries. In addition, the 
military was, in comparison to those neighboring countries, poorly equipped. 184 One 
important aspect in the allocation of budgetary resources was the high financial 
contribution to army in comparison to the navy and the air force. The distribution of 
resources among different branches of the armed forces implies that the threat was 
perceived from inside.185 Otherwise, it would be wise to finance the navy in a peninsula 
country.186 In addition to its role over the society, the military influenced the politics 
through important posts in the government, in the representative organ (Cortes) and 
association with the private and public companies. 187  
To sum up, Franco’s own words define best the importance of the armed forces in 
the Franco’s authoritarian regime: “Much is said about the [Nationalist] Movement, 
trade unions, etc., but the reality is that the whole device is held together solely by 
Franco and the army.”188  
 
 
4.2 Civilianization of the Regime 
 
 The number of posts held in the council of ministers by the military officers had 
been declining simultaneously with the liberalization of the Franco since 1960s. 
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However; the manifestation of military political power remained relatively stable 
throughout the whole period of the Francoist system.189 The industrialization which 
naturally brought the liberalization of the political and economic rights required 
civilianization of the regime in 1960s. The civilianization of the regime is clearly 
indicated in the number of military bureaucrats and ministers in the government’s 
apparatus.190 The ministers with military origins formed 32.8% of the total number of 
ministers during the whole Franco regime. In comparison to authoritarian regimes in 
South America, the weight of the ministers with military origin is lower. However, the 
main reason of this average percentage is the civilianization in the last decade of the 
regime. While the percentage of the ministers in the first government in Francoist 
political system was 41.6%, that number dropped to 21% in the last cabinet appointed 
by the king Juan Carlos.191 Similar decline is also observed in the number of military 
parliamentarians as percentage of total number of parliamentarians in Spain’s Francoist 
Cortes. The percentage of the number of the military parliamentarians in the Cortes 
dropped from 19.1% in the 1943-46 Cortes to 11.3% in 1971-76. 192 Despite the 
liberalization and modernization trends during the Franco regime which eventually led 
the civilianization of the political institutions, the armed forces was one of the 
institutions most resistant to the pressures of modernization and liberalization. Franco, 
himself, also avoided modernization of the Spanish armed forces, prevented any 
unpopular reform of the bureaucratic military structures. Though highly inefficient, 
seniority was the main principle in promotion. 193 Agüero believes that this failure in 
democratization caused the military’s distance with the other elites for moving toward a 
consensus that occurred during the transition to democracy process. 194 
Other than the cabinet and the national assembly, the military participated in the 
other major organs of state and regime such as the Council of the Realms, the National 
Council of the Movement, the National Defense Board, security agencies and local 
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governments.195 The military also had police functions either directly or indirectly by 
delegating them to separate military groups that employ the means of legitimized 
violence on a day-to-day basis by  Guardia Civil (Civil Guard), and the State Security 
Bureau (Direccion General de Seguridad).196 Franco had already attempted to civilianize 
the regime to a certain extent immediately after his designation as the “Chief of the 
Government of the Spanish State” on September 1936 by la Junta de Defensa Nacional, 
(National Defense Junta) formed upon rebelling against the Republic in 1936.197 Franco 
took precaution against over-involving the armed forces through periodic changes of 
regional commands, removal of any potential political challengers, the use of 
promotions and retirements to isolate dissenters, and cooptation of dissident military 
figures into the government.198 Franco replaced la Junta de Defensa Nacional with 
Technical Junta and eventually with a regular cabinet of his government. Despite the 
big numbers of military officers within the Junta, the power rested in the hands of the 
Franco. His dominance was proved when military officers requested the revival of 
monarchic Spain in 1943. Franco declined the requests of the armed forces, because he 
simply believed that it was too early for the restoration of the monarchy. Franco’s 
rejection of this offer by the military officers’ received no opposition or faced any 
discontent from the officers. That was the only corporate attempt by the military during 
the Franco regime. The next would be after his death when the legalization of the 
Communist Party was a matter of discussion during the transition to democracy 
process.199 Therefore, while the armed forces exert significant political influence during 
the Franco regime owing to filling of key posts in the regime’s political institutions, the 
armed forces was neither the single decision-maker nor the dominant actor in the 
Spanish politics. In addition, according to the numbers of posts within important 
political institutions the Spanish politics had already been in civilianization trend in the 
demise of the regime. 
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4.3 The Evaluation of the Armed Forces’ Role in the Transition 
 
Franco’s illness had started the debates for the succession of the head of state. 
Blanco’s assassination left the prince Juan Carlos as the strongest candidate. Thus, as 
agreed by Franco and the armed forces in the final years of the Franco, Juan Carlos de 
Borbon was crowned King Juan Carlos I of Spain on November 22, 1975. His first 
declaration in favor of the National Movement and the armed forces increased popular 
support for his presidency.200 
However, the succession of Franco was not the only matter of debate in the 
Spanish politics. Many other political issues raised the tensions among the actors of the 
Spanish politics. The armed forces’ preferences were apparent prior to the transition 
process. The armed forces sought to protect its privileged position within the politics. In 
addition, they were against the legalization of the leftist Unions which would open the 
door for legal return of militant Communist and Socialists. Inherited from their civil war 
memories, the armed forces were firmly opposing the legalization of the Communist 
Party. Also, Spanish army as the staunch supporter of the national unity of Spain stood 
against the recognition of nationalities in the Constitution which would bring the 
autonomous nationalities, such as Basques and Catalans, back to the Spanish political 
arena.201 Other than these political concerns of the military, the armed forces also had 
an institutional consideration which is related to the democratic opening of the new 
government. The government’s proposed amnesty law would include former members 
of the UMD.202 Therefore, this amnesty law would mean the reincorporation of UMD 
members into the army. The military’s main concern was keeping the internal 
discipline.203 Pardoning previously expelled members of UMD would cause discontent 
of the remaining members of the army and would encourage the oppositions in the 
military.  
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When we analyze the influence of military only by considering the level of 
realization of these institutional preferences, we would find out that the military was 
unsuccessful in influencing the outcome except the amnesty law. The reasons for this 
ineffectiveness may be interpreted differently. However, the influence of the military on 
the determination of the agenda explicitly influences the post-authoritarian regimes. 
Therefore, the level of democracy in the post-transition would naturally be affected by 
the role of military in the transition.  Agüero’s main argument asserts that: 
 
“A transition controlled by a unified military conducting the 
authoritarian exit is likely to result in a new arrangement in which 
military prerogatives are larger than in a full-fledged unrestrained 
democracy. A civilian-controlled transition…...is likely to lead to 
new, post authoritarian arrangement that starts out with fewer 
military prerogatives.”204 
 
Therefore the evaluation of the level of military’s influence or ineffectiveness 
during the Spanish transition provides insights for understanding the successful 
transition to democracy.  
 The military’s inability to influence the overall outcome rested on several 
factors. Agüero argues that those reasons were the dominance of civilians in setting the 
agenda for the transition which helped to pre-empt stronger military against 
democratization took place; military’s excessive and unfounded confidence in the 
influential elites’ (e.g. the king and Adolfo Suarez) commitment to Francoist 
credentials; and the high level of coalescence among the civilian elites which was 
empowered by the legitimate public support via referendums and elections.205 
Zaverucha explains the military’s ineffectiveness by evaluating its autonomy during the 
transition process. Through testing the military prerogatives suggested by Stepan, he 
concludes that Spain’s success in achieving civilian control over the military was 
resulted from the developments in the transition.206 
 The political reform plan was first announced in September 1976 by the 
president Adolfo Suarez. The legislation of the reform plan required the approval of the 
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Cortes. However, the approval of the political reform was almost equal to a 
“institutional suicide” by the corporatist Cortes.207 The armed forces’ and Francoist 
system’s participation to Cortes was noteworthy. Therefore, the Law for Political 
Reform needed to grant the approval of the Francoists as well. Before the voting of the 
law on September 10th, Suarez preferred to explain the reform process to the military 
staff. The reform process would set the elections for the new Congress prior to June 
1977 and the newly elected Cortes would decide upon the issues such as the autonomy 
for the historic regions, trade union reform and other reforms.208 Suarez met the armed 
forces’ generals two days prior to the announcement of the political reform plan. The 
meeting concluded positively and military consented to the reform plan by voicing their 
reservations on the potential drawbacks for the national unity and the legalization of the 
Communist Party.209 However, the navy minister Veiga’s quote confirms that the 
military was confident enough for the realization of the reforms in coherence with 
Francoist legality.210 
The confidence of the military staff in the democratic reform process’ harmless 
conduct rests upon the service ministers within the cabinet and the king’s strength 
inherited from the Franco.211 Thus, as long as the important positions were filled by the 
Francoists the armed forces’ members felt no need to intervene into the democratic 
process. 212 
 The level of change in the Spanish politics and the confidence rested upon the 
Francoists within the government provide a confusing case. It is hard to explain how the 
military was incapable of influencing the rapid democratization process while holding 
important institutional power. Agüero believes that the level of democratization in 
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Spain was itself “democratization by surprise”.213 In fact, the democratization could 
only happen as a surprise to democracy, because the Franco’s regime had built complete 
institutional and constitutional structure. Thus the rupture with Franco’s system was not 
really a feasible alternative. A rupture in the regime could cause an involution or 
political repression. Thus, the elected Cortes would deal with the problems of 
stateness214 and economic crisis. 215 
 Therefore, we may deduce that despite the relatively significant position of the 
military in Spanish politics during the Franco era, or in the initial stages of the transition 
period, the outcome simply was not influenced by the armed forces. To a certain extent 
the civilianized character of the outgoing regime could explain this phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that other factors existed during the Spanish transition which 
favored and facilitated the transition to democracy.  
To understand the democratization took place, it is crucial to explain why the 
military did not react to the reforms effectively. The armed forces had exerted pressure 
on the intelligence services, thus they were able to receive information on political 
developments. During the Franco’s rule, there were eleven different intelligence 
agencies. Within the Stepan’s prerogatives, the control of the peak intelligence service 
constitutes an important one.  Suarez’s initiatives aimed to curb the military’s influence 
over the intelligence service. Suarez attempted to create a central intelligence agency 
Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa (Superior Center of Defense 
Information-CESID) under civilian government. However, CESID started reporting to 
the armed forces instead of the government. Only after the first failed coup in February 
1981, the full control of the CESID was given to the civilians. In the post-transition 
process, this tendency continued and parliament gained the upper hand in the civilian 
control over the intelligence flow. 216 
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As an example to the contradictions between the armed forces and the reform 
process, the legalization of the non-official trade unions aligned with Communists and 
Socialists had raised doubts among the military officers about how far Suarez 
government’s democratization reforms could reach. Vice president Santiago resigned 
from his post and received support from the armed forces. Suarez appointed Lieutenant 
Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, army chief of staff to the vice presidency. Mellado was 
criticized within the armed forces because of his support for political and military 
reforms.217 Another example of the military’s ineffectiveness was the legalization of the 
Communist Party. The military firmly rejected the legalization of the Communist Party. 
But Suarez expected to legalize the party in order to increase the popular legitimacy of 
the prospective Cortes elections which would take place in June 1977. The crisis even 
led to resignation of the navy minister Veiga.218 The armed forces prevented further 
resignation of the other military ministers in the cabinet in purpose of avoiding Suarez 
to appoint civilians to the cabinet which would totally pacify the military within the 
cabinet. Instead, the military issued a strong statement reminding his duties regarding 
the unity of Spain, the crown and the flag. The Communist Party, in response, issued a 
conciliatory statement in their first press conference with the leaders appeared 
surrounded by the Spanish flag and pledged not to oppose the monarchy or the unity of 
Spain.219.  The legalization of the Communist Party contributed to political pluralism 
but obviously decreased the level of confidence between the military and rest of the 
political actors in the Spanish political system. This lack of confidence would stimulate 
the military to become more proactive and attempt to become aware of the secret 
agenda of the civilians prior to the realization of the reforms. In addition, that was a 
signal to the military that even they declare their rejection as a corporate they might not 
affect the outcome in a favorable way. While the military faced such difficulties in a 
regime where the formulation of the political institutions is in favor of itself, the newly 
elected institutions could present major challenges to the military’s interests. With this 
experience in failure to pursue corporate interests, the military acted in solidarity against 
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the amnesty law that could include the UMD members. The military voiced their 
concerns prior to the decision this time and the Congress acknowledged them. The level 
of consensus in the army around this issue prevented the civilians to confront military in 
that manner for the next decade on the amnesty of UMD members.220 Thus, even 
though the Cortes was democratically elected, and the Spanish politics witnessed a free 
and competitive election including previously suspended parties, the influence of the 
military remained at a certain extent. Therefore, the most important part of the new 
Cortes’ agenda, the new constitution, would start under this contest among the parties in 
the Spanish politics.  
The issues within the constitutional debates included highly contradictory 
elements such as the recognition of the autonomy of the nationalities, the place of the 
church or the prerogatives of the monarchy.221 The military was represented with a 
single defense minister in the cabinet. In addition, the constitutional committee in the 
Cortes was unwilling to discuss the issues with it. Therefore, the military could not 
possess enough leverage in the constitution making to enforce its preferences.222 
However, the military was not totally marginalized. While ETA members were causing 
the military discontent in order to realize their expectations, the military was insistent 
on the unity of Spain. Therefore Article 2 in the constitution added the “indissoluble 
unit of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards.” to the 
recognition of right to autonomy of the nationalities.223 
All of these events occurred during the transition process indicate that the military 
abstained from intervention into the politics even though crucial issues were at stake. 
Only exception to this fact was the uncovering of a major coup plot led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Antonio Tejero and Captain Ricardo Saenz de Ynesterillas in the fall of 1978. 
The conspirators were arrested but the punishments were less harsh than expected. 224 
However, that never implies that military had internalized returning to the barracks. 
Because the later coup attempt in the consolidation process showed that, the military in 
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fact considered a military rule as an alternative to civilian government. Thus, it is a 
question why the armed forces haven’t intervened into politics, for example amid the 
legalization of the Communist Party or the recognition of the nationalities. Agüero 
argues that the military instead opted for the least harmful choice rather than its 
preferred position in those cases.225 Both a military takeover and the resignation of the 
defense minister would be the alternatives for the military. However, both would have 
drawbacks as well. If the defense minister resigned, then the government could appoint 
a civilian which would totally exclude the military from the transition agenda. The 
second option, the military takeover, would deteriorate the relationship between the 
king and the military. The existence of monarchy was more than a heritage of Franco; it 
also meant the continuation of the respect for the Francoist institutions to which the 
king has shown utmost respect since his reign started. Hence, we may find out that the 
military acted rationally in those manners to become the influential actor again in the 
Spanish politics without an aggressive move that would attract discontent from within 
the society and international society. The elections had just been held, and the removal 
of the elected bodies would decrease the popular legitimacy of the Spanish military’s 
plans.  
The high level of unity among political elites was another characteristic of the 
Spanish transition among other transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe. 
Frequent resort to public support through referendums and elections always became the 
instruments for the high level of public support for the reforms. The turnout in the 
referendums were relatively high and the “yes” votes dominated the “no” votes. In the 
Cortes elections, the centre parties UCD and PSOE were supported instead of the 
extremist parties. Other than this mass level support, the Moncloa Pact, the attitude of 
press in favor of the reform process supported the government and discouraged the 
military to intervene.226 The risks were perceived as higher than the potential benefits; 
hence military abstained from a takeover. Then what has changed from these years to 
the time when the military attempted a coup by Captain Tejero and Guardia Civil. The 
motives behind the coup would explain the rationale of the military initiators.  The coup 
was planned to start in Cortes and the image of Tejero reflected in the TV would initiate 
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the other officers to conduct the rest of the coup plan in other regions. One of these 
officers was captain general of Valencia, Milans Del Bosch.227 Del Bosch implemented 
the plan in Valencia, yet as a result of several factors explained in this study, the coup 
attempt failed. The coup attempters mainly mentioned the unity of Spain and the 
importance of the king. Nevertheless, the official investigations following the coup 
attempt reached various findings about the goal of the attempters. According to these 
findings, one scenario suggests that the coup makers might have been hard-liners within 
the military who were inspired by the 1980 coup in Turkey which replaced democracy 
and its major accomplishments. The other scenario suggests that the attempters were the 
retired lieutenant generals who sought to establish a military junta in favor of the 
monarchy. The third scenario included the continuity of the parliamentary monarchy but 
limit the excesses of the process of state decentralization, to harden the counterterrorist 
struggle and to enhance the institutional position of the armed forces.228 These 
differences in objectives were a major setback for the success of the coup. The internal 
divisions within the military caused a failure.  
Agüero also argues that the military’s internal disunity caused the ineffectiveness 
in the transition process. The UMD crisis had already proven that the Spanish military 
was not a monolithic institution. The expelling of UMD members strengthened to 
internal unity nevertheless, at the time of the transition three groups within the military 
prevailed.229 Agüero categorizes these groups as the hard-liners, conservatives and the 
liberals according to their tolerance to the limits of transformation and their eagerness to 
exert influence if the outcome is different than they expected. Conservatives were 
tolerant for the transformation as long as the role of the military is preserved and the 
autonomy of the regions was not provided.230  The internal disunity of the military 
contributed to the transition for two important reasons: Firstly, the military hardly 
formed a stance in order to pressure the government for the reform plans, secondly the 
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government always found liberals within the army to appoint them to important posts at 
the time of liberalization and modernization.231 
 
 4.4 Consolidation of Democracy 
 
Even though the transition to democracy was completed with the passing of Law 
for Political Reform in 1977, completion of first democratic elections and the making of 
new Constitution, the role of military in Spanish politics were not eradicated. For 
example, Article 8 of the new Constitution reveals that the armed forces are comprised 
of “army, navy and air force”. This definition only excludes the “Public Order Forces” 
character of the armed forces defined by the previous Organic Law of State.232 This was 
partly related to demilitarization of the police. Demilitarization of the police was one 
other important aspect of civilian supremacy over the military. During the Franco era, 
Public Order Forces had a military character by virtue of their juridical definition and 
organic dependence. The general staff of the Guardia Civil was drawn from army 
cadres. In short, public order was a function of military men under Franco. The armed 
forces of that period were composed not only of army, navy and air force, but also 
included the agencies of public security. Thus, militarization of the police had been a 
permanent characteristic of the Spanish constitutional system.233 The old agents of 
repression had to be transformed into the guardians of the democracy. Firstly, 1978 
Constitution separated police forces from the military and established Fuerzos y 
Cuerpos de Seguridad (Security Bodies and Forces). Suarez renamed the Policia 
Armada (Armed Police) as the Policia Nacional (National Police). PSOE leader Felipe 
Gonzales’ government urged the training of the police in their own academies. The 
Guardia Civil was subordinated to the Interior Ministry in peace time, and to the 
Defense of Ministry. In 1986, a civilian was appointed to head the Guardia Civil for the 
first time in the last 150 years.234 In addition to tendency to demilitarization of the 
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police, Article 8 states that the armed forces were charged with the protection of the 
constitutional order of democratic Spain instead of the institutional order of the 
Francoist state.235 The armed forces’ failure to influence the transition process is not 
tantamount to its disappearance from the political arena. Instead, exclusion of the 
military from the elite consensus that characterized the Spanish transition presented the 
military as the most potent threat to the democracy.236 Apparently, Spanish military as a 
whole could not offer a democratic alternative as Portuguese military did. 237  Therefore, 
curtailing the assertiveness of Spanish military was a prerequisite for the consolidation 
of democracy. Various Constitutional changes during the transition even enhanced the 
military’s actual power. For example the establishment of Joint Chiefs provided the 
collective voice the military had previously lacked.238 
The transition was not capable to solve all the divisive issues in the society. The 
implementation of transformed norms and institutions remained pending. The judiciary 
system, the system of autonomies and the role of the military in the post-transition were 
left to be determined by organic laws.239 One important aspect of civilian supremacy is 
the military personnel’s judgment by the civilian courts. 1978 Constitution established 
the principle of single jurisdiction for both civilian and military offences. The Organic 
Laws 12 and 13 in 1985 regulated the Military Penal Code and determined that 
involvement in a coup or lack of respect for civilian authorities would bring the officers 
into the civilian court. 240 
The new openings in the regime in favor of the recognition of autonomous 
nationalities raised the tensions between the military and the government. The military 
was critical of vice-president Mellado and his alignment with the reformists. Thus even 
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the appointment of the chief of staff led to a crisis between the government and the 
military. While the constitutional amendments were being made for autonomous 
regions, the numbers of ETA activities increased.241 Military perceived the tension 
between territorial autonomy and terrorism as a trend toward regional independence and 
national disintegration.242 ETA’s main goal was separatism and not autonomy. 
Especially the assassination of the Madrid’s military governor by ETA and increasing 
the attacks against the military officers stimulated public protests in the funerals which 
called for empowering the army.243 On these occasions, despite the deaths of military 
officers and the inevitable difficulties of creating Spain’s quasi-federal state, none of the 
important statewide interest groups of parties engaged in blaming democratization.244 
The military’s discontent for the civilian-led reforms was displayed when the mid-level 
officers in charge of planning an operation to capture the cabinet in the Moncloa Palace 
were arrested. The softness of the punishment for the interventionist in comparison to 
indiscipline within the armed forces by UMD members proves that the military 
tolerated the attempts for political intervention but the internal indiscipline.245 The 
increasing terrorist attempts and public protests in the funerals encouraged hard-liners to 
regroup within the armed forces to avoid the threats to the mission and institution of the 
armed forces. The military intervention started to be discussed among the military 
members following the unavoidable speed of the reforms and increasing ETA activities. 
Therefore, both the military men involved in the abortive coup d’etat of February 23, 
1981 and Manifesto of the Hundred246 were sharing the perception that the national 
unity of Spain was under threat by the tendency toward autonomous independence. 247 
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In addition to unrest in the military, the military retained its strength in the 
political system by the creation of Joint Chiefs. The creation of a defense ministry 
instead of three military ministers in the cabinet was an attempt to decrease the 
efficiency of the military.248 Suarez established the first ministry of defense in July 
1977. He appointed Mellado as the defense minister of the cabinet. Mellado was a 
liberal within the armed forces. The military was critical of his reformist attitude 
undermining the concerns of the armed forces. Mellado has been the only minister of 
defense with military origin. In 1978, Suarez appointed a civilian, Augustin Rodriguez 
Sahagun.249 Another important variable an effective transition to defense ministry was 
the number of educated civilians for defense studies. Franco’s Spain had already 
educated certain numbers of civilians within the CESEDEN (Centro Superior de 
Estudios de la Defensa Nacional- Centre of Higher National Defense Studies) The 
percentage of civilians in the higher military studies was more than the percentage of 
each branches of the armed forces in the later years of Franco.250 
However, creation of the defense ministry and appointing a civilian was not 
sufficient to subordinate military to the civilians. Newly established Joint Chiefs’ 
importance increased. In contrast to other transitions in southern Europe, the military in 
Spain remained institutionally intact 251 and resurfaced with renewed vigor to press its 
corporate claims.252 Surprisingly, instead of weakening of military in the government 
after the transition, the slowness of modernization and the blocking of reincorporation 
of UMD members and assertiveness of the hard-liners prove this argument.253Besides 
the discontent within the army for the government, the ruling party had also internal 
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problems and public support for UCD was declining. Suarez’s resignation followed this 
crisis.  
Even though the transition was not under military’s control, the fear of a coup 
d’etat was limiting the democratization.254 The military’s influence in politics continued 
until the failed coup attempt in February 1981. The civilian supremacy of the regime 
was not attained by the transition to democracy. Military’s resistance for change was 
transformed into assertiveness as a response to increasing ETA activities.255 King Juan 
Carlos supported and encouraged military to fight against the separatists. King’s 
backing was perceived by the military as a support for military’s role in politics. That 
caused military to miscalculate King’s actual support for the military.256 Suarez’s 
reforms had reached beyond the expectations of military; therefore military’s support 
for Suarez’s democratization project was declining. Vilanova’s findings indicate that the 
percentage of officers hostile to democracy in 1983 were more than it was in 1975 when 
many soldiers accepted the idea of peaceful, gradual change and under the King’s 
direction.257 Thus on the day of the election of the new presidency, Colonel Tejero 
occupied the Cortes with heavily armed Guardia Civil. However, the armed forces did 
not receive the support they expected from the king and from the public. Moreover, the 
hard-liners had no plan for the governance and could not avoid deep divisions within 
themselves. The officers who attempted the coup were sentenced to prison and expelled 
from the armed forces.258 The failed coup attempt was followed by the first ever 
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government without military participation since 1939 by Calvo Sotelo. 259  Share finds 
the failure of the coup as an encouragement for democracy even though it implied the 
fragility of the democracy as well.260 Majority of the Spanish Political elite, from right 
to left, had criticized the coup attempt unambiguously. That signals that unity among 
political elites supporting for democratic rule constituted the ultimate protection for 
democracy.261 Maravall, in his analysis of public opinion during the transition to 
democracy, states that only 4 percent of the Spaniards were in favor of the coup and 76 
percent was against it. Moreover, 47% stated that if the coup had been successful they 
would have come to the defense of democracy. This tendency was a much bigger trend 
in France when rumors of army intervention spread in 1968. Only 9% of the French 
people claimed their support for democracy following a coup.262 
Following this failed coup attempt, the elections were held in 1982, and resulted 
with the success of the PSOE. As expected from the Socialists, they presented strong 
commitment to the civilian supremacy. They invigorated the defense and military 
reform. PSOE opted for NATO membership which facilitated the reforms for the 
defense sector. Military has started becoming central defense structure instead of a 
political institution.263 The Socialist Government guaranteed the civilian supremacy in 
the second term of its government. The appointment of the former health minister as the 
defense minister signals the supremacy of the civilians over the military in 1991. 
Within the new formulation of democratically elected Cortes less military 
members than ever existed. Only the appointed members of the military by the king 
could enter into Cortes, which was supposed to initiate the drafting of the new 
Constitution. Also, creation of the single defense ministry in 1977 had decreased the 
physical attendance of the military in the cabinet. Former Francoists in the government 
were pushing for the reform process. The military, even though a little late, realized that 
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only direct and non-legally prescribe pressure could protect its interests and 
preferences.264  
The Cortes’ supremacy over the government and the military was attained by 
Organic Law 6 approved in July 1980. The law allows the regulation of the national 
defense and military organization by the Cortes. Another Law approved in June 1981 
allocated the sole right of appointing or dismissing the military authorities to uphold the 
order. The supremacy of Parliament was finally guaranteed in 1984 by increasing the 
Prime Minister and Cortes’ authority in declaring war and debating the general lines of 
defense policy. In accordance, the defense minister would only be able to perform the 
tasks of the Prime Minister on defense and military policy with the authorization of the 
Prime Minister. Parliament was given the authority to approve defense laws and budgets 
and promotions in the military structure. 265 As a result of the civilian supremacy, the 
parliament decides whether the military would intervene or not and military has no 
control over the specific areas of economic activity.266 
In conclusion, the transition through agreement among civilians avoided the 
armed forces to become influential during the process. The necessary reforms were 
made, and the civilians’ confidence in the sustainability of democracy increased. 
However, the consolidation was delayed until the failed coup attempt of the armed 
forces in February 1981 and PSOE’s commitment to civilian supremacy and 
democratization following their election victory in 1982. The 1982 elections, with a 
high voting turnout (around 80%), was interpreted as a real plebiscite in favor of 
democracy. 267. That increased the confidence and legitimacy of the PSOE government.  
Nevertheless, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue the failed coup attempt and the 
supportive reaction from within the military and the society to the imprisonment of 
leaders of coup attempt was crucial for the consolidation of democracy in Spain. 
Otherwise, as they suggest, the oppositions within the military might have continued to 
challenge the Spanish transition to democracy. 268 
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CHAPTER 5 
             The Role of the Military in Transition to Democracy in Turkey  
 
The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Turkey took place after 
the military rule in 1980-83. As I explained in Chapter 3, the Turkish military 
intervened to suppress the rising political violence and prevent further political 
instability.  The political elite, namely the major political parties, failed to overcome 
the problems of the country. Dissoluble coalition governments, societal cleavages, 
left-right clashes in the public spaces, and populist public policies characterized the 
Turkish Politics in late 1970s. The deadlock in the 1980 presidential elections 
confirmed that civilians were no longer able to cooperate in political matters; instead 
their rivalry contributed to an escalation of the crisis. The Turkish military, according 
to the Internal Service Act269, was in charge of protecting and guarding the Republic 
of Turkey formed by the Constitution. In accordance with this legal basis, the 
military undertook the governmental powers on 12th of September. In the early days 
of the coup, General Evren promised a transformation back to the democratic 
principles as soon as the political environment reached the desired level. In other 
words, the military junta did not consider remaining in power too long.270  Transition 
from authoritarian to civilian rule was initiated and controlled by the military. MGK 
initiated a political liberalization with restrictions on political participation; later by 
the efforts of civilian political elite the redemocratization followed the political 
participation.  
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The first elections following the military rule were held in 1983, by excluding 
the prominent political parties and their leaders of 1970s.  In the absence of these 
political parties and with MGK’s authority of conclusive approval of new party 
applications the military was unrivaled at the outset of the transition process.  
The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Turkey was rather a 
process of reform than a rupture with the past. The reform mode of transition is 
characterized by a transition process which is initiated and controlled by the 
authoritarian power holders.271 In general, transition through reform allows the 
authoritarian power holders to determine the conditions of releasing their power in 
the government and obtaining exit guarantees in the new democratic political 
order.272 In accordance with these theories, the Turkish military could take its place 
within new institutional design of the political system and exert political influence, 
albeit limited, in the post-military rule years.273  Transition to democracy in Turkey 
presented different outcomes than the military’s initial expectations. The desired 
political stability for economic and political recover was only achieved during the 
first decade after the military rule, and eventually the fragmentation in political party 
system led to rise of political Islam in mid 1990s.  
The military held a significant degree of autonomy in state affairs due to the 
1971 and 1973 constitutional amendments.274 Nonetheless, the military’s autonomy 
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in Turkish Politics has become more sensible after the 1982 constitution. Cizre-
Sakallıoğlu argues that the absence of any alternative power preserving the status 
quo and the lack of pact-making culture in Turkish Politics left the military 
unchallenged even after the civilianization of the regime.275 Additionally, the 
military rule bequeathed a legacy, the 1982 constitution, including political 
prerogatives and judicial exemptions for the military.276 The civilianization of the 
regime after the military rule started earlier than expected, but Turkey is still distant 
from achieving civilian supremacy over the military, a desirable condition in a liberal 
democracy. 277 
 
5.1 The Military’s Reluctance to Remain in Power 
 
The military rule in 1980-83, as I explained in Chapter 3, immediately 
responded to two major challenges of Turkey, namely the rising political violence 
and worsening economic situation. Despite this relative success, the military 
abstained from remaining in power. Instead, as Evren promised in the first press 
conference following the coup, the military returned to its barracks and transferred its 
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powers to an elected civilian cabinet and a strengthened president.278 Therefore, 
rather than staying in power the military mainly aimed to restructure the political 
system and revamp the party system so that the mistakes of the past would not be 
repeated.279 The reluctance of generals to stay in power can be explained by several 
reasons.  
First, the military preferred to act in accordance with Atatürkist legacy. During 
the early republican years, a constitutional principle which regulated the soldiers’ 
legal participation in politics had been adopted. According to the rule “no person 
may be a deputy and hold office under the Government at the same time.”280 This 
law was strictly obeyed until the 1960 military intervention.  Therefore, staying out 
of politics was an Atatürkist legacy to which the commitment of the Turkish military 
is well known. However, the military rule in 1960-61 and 1980-83 indicates that the 
legacy only influenced the soldiers to a limited extent. Simply, Atatürkist legacy was 
not adequate to explain the generals’ reluctance to stay in power.   
Second, Turkey’s international commitments played a role in returning the 
country to democratic rule. Turkey was a member of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Council of Europe. Turkey had been immediately 
suspended from the membership of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of 
Europe after the coup d’etat. In addition, Turkey had signed an Association 
Agreement with the European Community which was intended to lead to full 
membership. Turkish government required to reach European standards of 
democracy to obtain EC membership. The Turkish Military was committed to 
maintaining ties with the West, and therefore took seriously the Western views 
presented through trade unions, human rights organizations, and politicians in the 
European Parliament. Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue that Turkey returned to 
democratic rule because of the international pressure. It is fair, however, to claim that 
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the military junta was not ignorant of the expectations of their international allies.281  
Evren’s press conferences mentioned numerous times the virtues of democracy and 
the Turkish military’s commitment to it. Evren also stated that they would be 
committed to the United Nations charter, NATO responsibilities and good 
relationships with any organization composed of democratic member countries, 
particularly the European Economic Community and the Council of Europe.282  
Third, the 1980 intervention was not the first military takeover in contemporary 
Turkish Politics. The military, therefore, acted in accordance with the lessons derived 
from past experiences. The Turkish military attached importance to its institutional 
unity and hierarchical order.283 Indeed, Evren attempted to prevent the minor 
members from participating in the coup to firm the hierarchy within the institution.284 
Evren’s warning to young officers to stay out of politics seems contradictory, but it 
had a rationale. The reasoning behind this approach was the internal discipline and 
hierarchical order of the armed forces were crucial for empowering the military and 
thus for guarding the regime. This was necessary to prevent young and radical 
officers from attempting a coup within a coup.285 Evren frequently visited the troops 
to convince them to support for MGK’s actions.286 Nevertheless, despite all these 
precautions, the top commanders were aware that interventions would have adverse 
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effects on the military’s professionalism and combat effectiveness.287 In order to firm 
the hierarchical decision-making, MGK took control of the state, and Chief of 
General Staff (CGS) Evren became the head of the state with his four force 
commanders. Evren agreed with these commanders not to make separate statements 
on political matters.288 The concentration of the power at the top level facilitated the 
decision to return to civilian rule. The risk of ideological polarization or 
politicization of the forces is correlated to the length of the stay in power. 289 In 
accordance with these reasons, the military aimed to restructure the political system 
to prevent future crises dragging the military into politics. Only then, the military 
becomes able to improve its operational capability to defend the Republic from 
internal and external threats.  
 
5.2 The Military’s Strategy for Transition 
 
Political and economic decay were undeniable by the end of the 1970s. 
Therefore, the military had a chance to preplan the involvement in detail.290 This plan 
included the details of the intervention and later the details of the new political 
system. As a result of this necessity, the military seemed to have determined the 
basic constitutional principles that would be enacted, the type of institutions that 
would be established, and the division of labor between the “state” and the 
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government, and the sort of mechanisms that would be needed to ensure smooth 
functioning after the return to civilian rule.291  
The Turkish Military, since the early Republican era, had been identified with 
statist political elites, particularly the CHP, until the 1971 memorandum. Karpat 
argues that 1971 memorandum revealed the process of alienation because it exposed 
the divergence of opinions on social classes, Atatürk, nationalism, secularism and 
reformism. CHP, under the leadership of Ecevit, attempted to transform itself into a 
truly socialist party, and rejected the concept of nation-state and nationality. 292 One 
major confrontation between civilians and the military in 1970s during the 
presidential election in 1973, which prevented the election of the candidate, Cemal 
Gürler, favored by the military, instead ended with a civilian compromise between 
AP and CHP on the election of another candidate, Fahri Korutürk. The election of 
Korutürk represented a shift in the relative weights of the civilians and soldiers.293 
The presidential election was the first major confrontation of the civilians since the 
military rule in 1960-61. Following this sign of civilian supremacy over the military, 
CHP and AP assumed that civilians became strong enough to avoid the military 
influence in the politics.294 The dissolution of the alliance between the military and 
the various civilian statist groups continued until 1980 coup. Ultimately, military 
intervention in 1980 differed from the earlier examples by its non-partisan character. 
Karpat argues that, this character increased the popular support towards military 
junta. The coup marked a new period of modernization with “division of labor” 
between the state and the government.295 Most probably, the alienation between the 
political elite and the military necessitated this division of labor. The bureaucracy 
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and the intelligentsia were also divided as a result of the turbulence in the country.296 
Instead of the political elite familiar with the military, a strong president would 
represent the state and protect its interests in the post-1983 years.  
With all these existing variables, MGK determined a strategy of political 
liberalization rather than an immediate democratization.  According to the military, 
political parties were responsible for the crisis in the 1970s. Political parties, instead 
of responding to the needs of the society, weakened the state, divided the citizenry 
and promoted enmity among them.297 The minor parties (MHP and MSP) used their 
seats in the parliament as a political leverage to impose their radical preferences on 
the policies of the major ones (AP and CHP) who were strongly in need of a 
coalition partner because of their obstinate competition. Evren, almost in every 
occasion, blamed the oligarchic structure and the leaders of the political parties who 
failed to avoid the country from corruption and political violence.  
Nevertheless, MGK was still in favor of appointing a civilian cabinet 
subordinate to MGK.298  Firstly, they asked Turhan Feyzioğlu299 to preside over the 
cabinet. Feyzioğlu conditioned this offer to the inclusion of major parties’ (AP and 
CHP) moderate members within the cabinet. Inclusion of moderate members of AP 
and CHP would correspond to MGK’s demands as well. MGK expected to increase 
popular legitimacy of the cabinet through these civilian members. However, the 
moderates of AP and CHP declined to participate in a cabinet subordinate to MGK. 
The members’ attachment to their party leaders in custody prevented them from 
joining the cabinet.300 Thus, MGK lost patience and their remaining confidence in 
the civilians. Delaying the formation of the cabinet could lead to chaos. Therefore, 
ex-Admiral Bülend Ulusu was given the authority to form a cabinet. The new cabinet 
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with twenty-seven members, including six retired generals and neutral bureaucrats 
and academics, was announced in September 21st.301 The disagreement over the 
formation of the cabinet indicated that cooperation between military and political 
elites is unlikely. Also, the formation of an alternative cabinet proves that the 
military was able to adopt a new strategy when the plan proceeded unpredictably. 
The military immediately picked its second choice and formed a cabinet with non-
political actors and former generals.   
MGK’s main objective for the post-coup period was establishing a political 
system which would bring stability to the regime, so that they would not have to 
intervene into politics. From these early experiences of military rule with existing 
political parties’ reluctance to cooperate with military junta , MGK deduced that only 
centrist parties with prevailing Atatürkist ideology would bring stability to the 
regime. Furthermore, they believed that the new consultative assembly in charge of 
drafting the constitution should be free of old and failed politicians.302 Only then, the 
legal foundations of the new political system; namely the Constitution, Political 
Parties Law and Election Law would be drafted without the politicians who were 
blamed for being too entrenched in their political positions to reflect popular will.  
Consequently, the military determined an ambitious project that aimed at 
transforming the institutional pillars of Turkish Politics and revamping the traditional 
political party system. The military’s project involved prohibition of all existing 
parties and banning their leaders from political activity for five to ten years. They 
aimed to promote a new centrist party with close ties to the military and to rewrite 
the legal, constitutional, and electoral rules governing the Turkish political system. 
The military also believed that democratic political stability in Turkey required the 
establishment of a new party system that would be based on two moderate, centrist 
parties and exclude the extremist parties of the radical left, ultranationalist right, and 
Islamic fundamentalism. The new party system with changes in electoral system 
towards a majoritarian system instead of proportional one would pave the way for a 
single party government ensuing democratic stability. 303 
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With all these purposes in mind, political parties of the pre-coup period were 
immediately banned from political activities on September 12th. However, they were 
not dissolved until October 1981. Although the military lost confidence in pre-
existing political parties which led the country into political, economic and social 
crises, they were looking for a gradual transition to new party system. Instead of the 
political parties as a whole, the leaders of the parties received harsher treatment. For 
example, Erbakan (MSP) and Türkeş (MHP) were arrested in 1981; Ecevit (CHP) 
and Demirel (AP) were both held in custody for a month.304 Demirel remained silent 
following his release; however Ecevit attempted to exert influence in the Turkish 
politics as an editor of a journal, Arayış (Search), and gave interviews to foreign 
newspapers and broadcasting organizations.305 Both Demirel and Ecevit continued to 
influence their party members. These endless endeavors of political leaders to remain 
in the politics tempted the military to the idea of a complete restructuring of the 
political party system. Then, a provisional article in 1982 Constitution stated that the 
major staff of the political parties would stay out of politics for a considerably long 
time.306 
At this point, the military’s hesitation regarding the party system reveals that, 
the military was in favor of continuity with existing parties through appointing their 
moderate members in the cabinet. The end result was total closure of the parties in 
October 1981. Hence, we may argue that the military’s plans over the party system 
changed according to the developments during the military rule. The political party 
members’ reluctance to cooperate with MGK rule caused the military to become 
harsher against the political parties. Moreover, the political parties’ continuous 
efforts to appeal to the masses with remarks criticizing the implementations of the 
military junta convinced the military that establishing a stable political system was 
not possible with the existence of these parties and their leaders.307 Finally, the 
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leaders’ involvement in the proposition of the candidates for the DM was the straw 
that broke the camel’s back. 308  
As MGK totally abandoned the idea of transition to new political system with 
existing parties, they renewed their strategy. Thus, the new Constitution and the 
Political Party Law determined the character of the political parties. Political Party Law 
strengthened the Provisional Article in the Constitution and outlawed Marxist, Kurdish 
separatist and Islamic fundamentalist parties, as well. All of the parties were obliged to 
remain attached to the “principles and reforms of Atatürk”.309 As I explained in the 
Chapter 3, establishment of a new party, participation in the elections and the methods 
of propaganda were subjected to strict supervision of MGK. Ultimately only three 
political parties (ANAP, MDP and HP) could compete in the elections.  By restricting 
twelve of fifteen parties applied for the elections, MGK aimed to provide a new party 
system which would provide a stable and effective government. MDP was claimed to 
represent the centre right and was favoured by the armed forces. HP was supposed to 
form a loyal opposition as a centre-left party. In the meantime, ANAP espoused a 
commitment to liberal economic policies and conservative cultural values.  
The making of 1982 Constitution was under close monitoring of MGK, too. 
Despite the existence of a DM in charge of drafting a constitution, as I explained in 
Chapter 3 of this study, MGK held the full authority in the appointment of DM 
members and in the amendments to the draft constitution.   
According to the new constitution, the new political system was a two-tiered 
regime where the state is “divorced from politics”.310 The President has become the 
“representative of the state” with the authority to maintain the territorial integrity and 
security of the state and the modernist features of the regime and to exercise a mild 
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form of tutelage over the government. Parliament, bureaucracy and the cabinet, were 
designed to conduct day-to-day affairs of the government within the framework set 
by the state through Constitution and certain laws.311 In addition, many provisions of 
the 1982 Constitution referred to the territorial and national integrity of the state and 
to the modernizing reforms of Atatürk. Inclusion of these types of values cherished 
by the military within the Constitution provides an example for the tutelary powers 
of the military in the post-coup period.312 Another example of the laws empowering 
the tutelary powers of the military is the law on MGK.313 The national security was 
defined broadly as “the protection of the constitutional order of the state, its national 
existence, and its integrity; of all of its interests in the international field, including 
political, social, cultural, and economic interests; and of interests derived from 
international treaties against all external and internal threats”. Therefore, the 
military’s responsibilities reached beyond the external and internal threats, included 
also the “promotion of country’s ability to achieve its national objectives”.314 Also, 
by electing the former General Evren as the new president, or the representative of 
depoliticized state, the military ensured continuity with military rule.  Evren took 
responsibility over all matters which are considered as important by the military such 
as “high politics” issues and higher education matters.315 The president and the 
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military were content to leave the economical issues to the government.316 Evren was 
also granted a strengthened veto power over the constitutional changes which 
required a three-fourths majority of the Parliamentarians to pass the law.317 The 
Government operated strictly according to this division of labor.318 Özal’s consent to 
this sort of a cooperation raised doubts over the civilian and democratic character of 
his government during the first term of ANAP’s government.319 Other than Evren, 
five members of the Junta would constitute the Presidential Council.320 The 
Presidential Council had only advisory powers; however, they enjoyed full 
parliamentary immunity.321 
Prior to elections in November 1983, the military abstained from openly 
favoring a party. However, Evren’s TV speech two days before the elections implied 
that the military was in favor of the MDP. MDP, led by a former general Turgut 
Sunalp, was expected to represent the centre-right. HP, led by Necdet Calp, was 
considered to be a moderate opposition left party.322 The third party allowed to 
compete in the elections was Turgut Özal’s ANAP. Özal acted as the economic 
advisor of Demirel and minister of economy in the Ulusu cabinet. Özal had resigned 
from his post in the Ulusu cabinet upon a replacement of Minister of Finance. His 
alienation from the Ulusu cabinet could positively affect his popularity in the 
elections.  Upon a meeting between Evren and Özal after ANAP won the elections,  
General Evren professes that he misperceived Özal’s political views and would not 
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let him to establish his party if he knew them in advance.323 Nevertheless, closing his 
party prior to elections could harm the democratization endeavors in Turkey. MGK, 
by approving these three parties in the elections, expected a lenient MDP government 
which would conduct day-to-day administration of the state in cooperation with the 
president conducting the “high politics” issues. The president would also supervise 
the government to stay in accordance to the principles of Constitution. HP was 
expected to constitute a loyal opposition, so that competition between the parties 
would not become a source of instability. The former political leaders were already 
banned from political activities for ten years by a provisional article in Constitution. 
Since MGK perceived these prominent leaders as the main source of conflict, 
expected the public support to decrease by the time their political bans are lifted. In 
addition the electoral law adopted prior to 1983 elections included rules favorable to 
major parties. The law included high thresholds to prevent minor parties from 
gaining seats in the parliament.324 Finally, elections were held on November 6th, 
1982 and ANAP gained majority of the seats in the parliament.  
The military was indeed surprised with ANAP’s clear victory despite Evren’s 
public support for MDP. 325 The conduct of civil-military relations during the ANAP 
government would play an important role for the regime’s stability. ANAP was a 
coalition of various rightist groups of the 1970s. The party included former members 
of MSP and MHP.326 Thence, the military was suspicious about ANAP’s character. 
In order to avoid this unrest between the government and the statist elites, the 
president took responsibility over highly sensitive issues including internal and 
external security, as well as foreign affairs and higher education. Evren acted as the 
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head of the cabinet when these issues are on government’s agenda. On the other 
hand, Özal was involved with economic issues. 327  
In conclusion, the military’s initial plan of transition to a new party system with 
existing parties fell to the ground. Former political party leaders continued to exert 
influence on politics through their attachment with members of their parties. 
Moreover, the following expectation, with a lenient government in coherence with 
military’s strategy under MDP during initial years of the post-coup period, was not 
realized, either. ANAP’s victory in elections indicated that Turkish voters preferred 
to be represented by one of its own, rather than a military-backed party. 328 This 
tendency was revealed again in the results of 1984 municipality elections. As 
SODEP and DYP participated in elections, HP and MDP could only become fourth 
and fifth parties, respectively.  
Another challenge for the military was the demands for lifting the political bans 
of former political party leaders. The military was aware that, both Ecevit and 
Demirel sustained their linkages with DSP and DYP, respectively. These leaders 
participated in every part of the political life, except designating themselves as the 
leader of the party. Early in 1986, Evren agreed to lift the ban on public speaking, but 
retained the bans on their political participation.329 This gradual shift towards 
political liberalization ended with Evren’s consent to lifting the bans completely. The 
bans were lifted by a slight majority in a referendum in 1987, and both leaders 
returned to lead their parties.330 The referendum marked as the starting of the new 
phase, redemocratization, in Turkish politics.331  
In conclusion, these events indicated that, the military’s strategies to restructure 
a new party system by excluding the former parties and their leaders were unlikely to 
be implemented. Civilians responded to these efforts in various occasions. During the 
military rule, former members of CHP and AP declined to participate in a cabinet 
subordinate to MGK. Later, as soon as the new elections were announced, fifteen 
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new parties applied for election. This trend indicated that fragmentation in party 
system was likely to continue. Even though military tried to prevent this outcome by 
limiting the numbers of the parties to three, the party which was least identified with 
the military’s preferences won the majority of the votes and the seats in the first 
elections. The results of the elections proved that Turkish people demanded to be 
represented by a civilian political party rather than a military-backed party. The 
results of municipality elections in 1984, reiterated that the artificial party system 
planned by the military would not comply with the political tendencies of the Turkish 
people. Despite the bans on political expression and political participation of the 
former leaders, Demirel and Ecevit’ s insistence to stay within politics by retaining 
their linkages with political parties indicated that the political restrictions have not 
benefited to a stable party system, at all. Eventually, the referendum results over the 
political bans reflected that people, in other words civilians, demanded the politics to 
become civilianized.  
 
5.3 Demilitarization of Turkish Politics 
 
Although the influence of the military continued in the initial years of the 
transition the military repeatedly announced that they were preparing to return to 
their barracks. Then CGS, General Necdet Üruğ, pointed out that the military would 
return fulfilling only its operational duties at the end of 1985.Martial Law was 
gradually lifted from the beginning of 1984. 332 
 As I explained above, political elites’ determination to remain within politics, 
and people’s support for civilians through frequent elections and referendums 
convinced the military that they need to co-exist with civilian elites in the political 
system. The influence of military gradually diminished in Turkish politics till early 
1990s. This transition process has occurred more tranquil than expected. First 
civilians and soldier enjoyed a modus vivendi where operated in a division of labor, 
and finally the civilians started to prevail in politics.  
 The election of Özal as the new president of Turkey in 1989 implied a major 
change in Turkish Politics. Özal was the first ever civilian president since the 
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overthrown of Celal Bayar in 1960. Later, Demirel’s election as head of state in 1993 
was more striking since he had experienced two military interventions during his 
prime ministry. The significance of the president’s powers for military and for the 
guardianship of the state has already been mentioned above. Therefore, military 
consented to civilians to presidency which they empowered as the representative of 
the state as a guardian to civilians’ corrupted politics. The developments from the 
end of the military rule to the election of Demirel as president explain the gradual 
civilianization of the regime and facilitate it to understand the process.  
First of all, the military was in total agreement with Özal’s economic policies. 
The military had already ceased to adopt Import Substitution Industrialization policy 
applied before 1980s and agreed with the interventionist development strategies of 
Özal.333 Hence the economic issues would not constitute a source of conflict between 
the civilians and the soldiers.  
 ANAP’s majority in the parliament following the 1983 elections was 
questionable because of restrictions in political participation. Özal demanded to lift 
the political bans prior to municipality elections in 1984. Evren declined the 
parliamentary decision in accordance with Özal’s demands. However, the parliament 
adopted the law with absolute majority and the municipality elections were held in 
March 1984. The reasons for Evren’s rejection are ambiguous. Following the 
decision, Özal opposed amnesty for thousands of people involved in violence during 
the years of the military rule and kept military content. 334 This event provides an 
example that military consented to a resolution on a political issue considering its 
interest in a legal matter and also an example for the supremacy of the parliament 
over the president. Another outcome of this example was Evren’s commitment to 
constitutional principles despite his discontent with the proposal. 
The first major problem between the government and the military emerged 
following Özal’s remarks over the concept of “civil society”. Özal referred to 
transformation from religious communitarianism to nationalism during Atatürk’s 
period and questioned the notion of “people for the state”. Özal’s remarks raised 
doubts about his party’s fundamentalist wing and their influence.  MGK immediately 
presented a report concerning the fundamentalism in Turkey. Özal responded to 
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comments spread all over the media by implying that the fundamentalism was a 
problem faced by both sides; the military and the government. 335 Thus, Özal’s 
moderate discourse avoided escalation of crisis. Özal was absolutely aware of the 
MGK’s sensitivities and abstained from raising tensions between his government and 
MGK. Therefore, it is arguable that the government conceived the limits of politics, 
and preferred a moderate discourse at the time of the rumors of a new intervention 
spread around.  
Another example for civil-military conflict during Özal’s government was 
related to promotion of a new CGS.  Özal replaced General Üruğ with General 
Torumtay instead of General Öztorun who was the favorite candidate of the General 
Staff. The president consented to the change by signing all necessary decrees.336 That 
replacement signaled both the increase in the power of civilian governments vis-à-vis 
the military and the alienation of the state (with the president as its representative) 
from the military. Earlier attempts in 1970s had already proved that the military was 
hesitant to release its power on promotion of senior officers. For Özal, the 
appointment of Torumtay was a signal of normalization in civil-military relations 
where prime minister has the final say to nominate the candidate to the president. A 
similar practice showed in the following years under DYP’ s leader Çiller’s 
government provided that incumbent CGS’s willingness to stay in the power for an 
extended period of time was welcomed by the government.337 It is arguable that 
despite existing laws which allow the appointment of CGS by the president upon 
prime minister’s proposal, the influence of incumbent CGS is sensible. In addition to 
the appointment procedure of the CGS, constitutionally the General Staff was 
responsible to the prime ministry instead of the defense ministry.338 Hale argues that, 
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during the initial years of civilianization following the military rule, defense ministry 
functioned as the secretary services of the military instead of guiding defense 
policies. 339 Although Özal promised to change this structure during the election 
campaign prior to 1987 elections, the results of the elections did not provide him a 
comfortable majority to amend the constitution without other concerns340. However, 
the government has been involved more in the defense matters, albeit far from 
standards in Western democracies.341  
The forthcoming elections in 1987 supposedly affected Özal’s relations with 
the military. As experienced before, political parties in close affiliation with the 
military failed to win the elections. MDP was the most recent example of this trend.  
As Özal government’s power became more visible simultaneously with the military’s 
gradual strategy of civilianization, Özal started applying a policy curtailing the 
influence of the military on public policy. The government started introducing new 
legislation allowing collective bargaining, strikes, public meetings and 
demonstrations, the right to form associations and to make collective petitions. The 
military liaison officers in each ministry were lifted, death sentences passed by the 
military courts were not approved by the Parliament and restrictions on the 
establishment of new political parties were lifted. The martial law was due to expire 
in the entire country in July 1987. Government’s alternative plan was establishing 
regional governorship headed by a civilian with extraordinary power to coordinate 
and implement counterinsurgency measures against separatist guerillas in eight 
southeastern provinces.342   
 In addition to the influential role of a President with military origin, the 
military expected to be influential through a political party, MDP, in the post-1983 
years. However, MDP’s failure in two consecutive elections, 1983 and 1984, 
indicated that this option was not viable. Thus, the military retained considerable 
influence over governmental authority through the formulation of the MGK members 
in favor of the military. The responsibilities of the MGK indicated that it has been an 
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instrument for the tutelary power of the military in the post-coup period.343 The 
Council of the Ministers was required to give priority consideration to the decisions 
of the MGK.344 In other words, MGK was filling the gap between the political parties 
and the military. MGK’s influence has been widely debated since 1980. Inclusion of 
MGK within the institutional design raised doubts over the military’s perception of 
democracy. For the military, a non-elected body’s interference with politics, MGK in 
this case, was tolerable.345 MGK’s presence also raised doubts about the reach of the 
civilianization in the Turkish politics. In a democratic setting, the existence of MGK 
would only be acceptable as long as its concerns are limited to national security. 
However, the definition of national security as stated above encompasses more than 
defense matters in Turkey. Therefore MGK, in 1980s, voiced its concerns on 
ideological issues, especially on the secularism-Islamism cleavage.346 Nevertheless, 
it is fair to admit that MGK exerted less influence over the politics than expected 
during the 1980s. MGK inclined to limit its recommendations on the defense 
matters.347  
The disagreement on the role of Turkey in the Gulf War constitutes an example 
for comparing the power of MGK and government in early 1990s. Turkey’s foreign 
policy during the Gulf War was mainly determined by Özal’s preferences and 
strategies.  One incident was the resignation of CGS Necip Torumtay because of his 
disagreement with the government on the operation to Northern Iraq. Özal had 
demanded the military to be prepared for an operation, while Torumtay presented his 
concerns over the policy.348 This resignation implies the changing power relations 
between the government and the military. Even on a subject where the military’s 
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expertise is undeniable, the military acted as subordinate to civilians. The military 
preferred to advise rather than imposing a policy on the debate.349 MGK’s influence 
in Turkish politics was felt increasingly since mid 1990s. The numerical composition 
of MGK members and their responsibilities changed over time due to the 
constitutional arrangements in alignment with political reforms. Although the 
reforms are perceived as curbing the power of the military in politics, their outcome 
in practice hardly deny the role of MGK in Turkish Politics up to current date.  
Obviously, it is not likely that simply changing the role of MGK in the Constitution 
guarantees the strengthening of the civilians vis-à-vis the military. As a recent study 
reveals, a whole array of multifaceted variables including cultural, political and 
economic factors should not be ignored when the power of the military is evaluated 
in the politics. The recommendations of MGK are presented to the Council of 
Ministers through consensus in the MGK. Therefore the numerical composition of 
the MGK is not tantamount to the weight of different actors.350 In short, as Cizre-
Sakallıoğlu argues, MGK helps to “crystallize and spearhead the consolidation of 
military autonomy”.351 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that MGK’s influence until mid-
1990s was not a major challenge to the transition to democracy process.  
The control of the peak intelligence service is also a tool for military’s 
influence in politics. Even though Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (Central Intelligence 
Service-MİT) was responsible to the prime minister, the head of the agency was a 
uniformed general appointed by MGK. Therefore MİT had close contacts with the 
Office of the General Staff. Özal’s endeavors to civilianize MİT caused contradiction 
between the military and government. Ultimately, government declared that 
discriminating civilians and military was a mistake and the issues were not crucial 
for civilianization of the regime.352 The first civilian appointment as the president of 
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MİT was in 1992.353 Nonetheless, transparency of relationship between MİT and the 
military remains to be a problem for civilian control of intelligence services.  
Another factor, as I explained in Chapter 3, was the appointment of technocrats 
familiar with Özal’s policy choices to important posts within the bureaucracy. Even 
though the bureaucracy responded to Özal’s challenge by certain bureaucratic tactics, 
eventually that allowed the civilian’s supremacy in politics rather than the statist 
elements within the bureaucracy to become dominant.  
To sum up, civilian political elites opted for a cautious civilianization of the 
regime. Instead of adopting a pro-active role to shift the institutional design of the 
1982 Constitution into a civilianized system, they proceeded gradually. Özal adopted 
the division of labor between his government and the president during the initial 
years following the coup. The military also, because of international commitments 
and increasing confidence in ANAP government’s cooperation with statist elements, 
adopted a moderate stance against civilian governments.  The military perceived the 
constitutional arrangements as adequate to protect the principles of the Republic. 
They were already reluctant to stay in power for reasons stated above. The political 
process realized the difficulty of establishing the party system they desired. 
Therefore, the military was required to co-exist with existing political parties. MGK 
was empowered to fill this gap. Yet, except an Islamic fundamentalism threat, they 
remained silent in political issues.  
Thanks to this moderate atmosphere between political elites and military, Özal 
proceeded toward civilianization of the regime through appointments to important 
posts within bureaucracy and challenging military’s influence in foreign affairs and 
senior promotions. Meanwhile, former political party leaders insisted to remain in 
politics through their linkages to their parties. By 1987, it was understood that 
restricting prominent political figures benefited nothing, and they were lifted by a 
referendum. 
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5.4 Changing Power Balances in the Political Sphere 
 
In conclusion, transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Turkey 
occurred in three phases. Military rule in 1980-83 was followed by a political 
liberalization initiated and controlled from “above” till 1987 and by a 
redemocratization. It is hard to say that military ultimately accomplished its 
objectives. As I explained above, military had expected that a centre-right party with 
close ties to the military would govern the country in the post-coup years. Indeed, a 
centre-right party gained popular support following the military rule; however, it was 
Özal’s ANAP rather than MDP. Apparently ANAP benefited from the process, 
because prominent leaders of 1970s were banned and the new parties affiliated with 
former ones were not allowed to compete in the 1983 elections. This allowed ANAP 
a favorable atmosphere for implementation of economic reforms as a single-party 
government without major challenges. ANAP’s leader Özal became a prominent 
politician from early 1980 until his sudden death in April 1993.   
Another outcome of this transition from above was, indeed surprisingly, the 
political Islam in 1990s. Beginning with the military regime and during the ensuing 
ANAP governments from 1983 to 1991, state policy toward Islam underwent radical 
changes in style and substance. Cizre-Sakallioğlu argues that, in a dynamic state-
society relationship where tensions produced by economic liberalization aggravated 
the growing influence of ethnic and Islamic social and political forces, the state “had 
to reestablish its legitimacy on a new basis, rooted less in the insularity of the 
secular-modernist project (through bureaucratic domination) and more willing to 
incorporate the most important marker of local identity, Islam, into the official 
discourse.”354  During the military rule the state introduced compulsory religious 
instruction into primary and secondary schools, believing that the growing influence 
of Islamic religion was due to insufficient ‘enlightened’ religious education. Military 
administration decided to promote Islam as an antidote against the threat of 
communism.355 Incorporation of Islam into official state ideology was thought to 
prevent politicization among youth which would eventually lead to the strength of 
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communism in universities. 356 The relationship between incorporation of Islam into 
the state ideology or instruction of religious education into schools and the rise of 
political Islam is not straightforward. However, the strategy of “Islamization of 
Secularism”357 in the post-1980 period and the revamped political party system 
facilitated the rise of political Islam and the victory of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party-
RP) in the 1995 elections. As observed in Table 11, the political Islam increased its 
popular support following the military rule in Turkey. In addition, the fragmented 
party system following the redemocratization by lifting political bans, contributed 
RP’s victory in the 1995 elections. RP received only 21.4 percent of the votes 
however became an influential actor in coalition-building negotiations. Even thought 
centre-right votes remained at a level around 40 percent, and the centre left votes at 
30 percent, the fragmentation within the blocs allowed RP to win the elections in 
1995.DYP-RP coalition and the rise of fundamentalism in Turkey eventually led to 
MGK’s memorandum in February 1998.358 Since the early 1990, Turkish democracy 
has been challenged by political Islam.  
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Table 11. Left-Right Spectrum in Turkish Parliamentary Elections 1973-1995 
 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 
Centre-
Right 
      
AP 29.8 36.9     
DP 11.9 1.8     
CGP 5.3 1.9     
MP 3.2 0.6     
ANAP   45.1 36.3 24 19.6 
MDP   23.3    
DYP    19.1 27 19.2 
Total 50.2 41.2 68.4 55.4 51 38.8 
Centre-Left       
CHP 33.30 41.4    10.7 
HP   30.5    
SHP    24.8 20.8  
DSP    8.5 10.8 10.6 
Total 33.30 41.4 30.5 33.3 31.6 21.3 
Islamists       
MSP 11.8 8.6     
RP    7.2 16.9 21.4 
Nationalists       
MHP 3.4 6.4    8.2 
MCP    2.9   
Source: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, “Genel Seçimler,”  
http://www.konrad.org.tr/secim/index.php, (accessed on July 10, 2007) 
Party names and acronyms: Adalet Partisi (Justice Party-AP), Demokrat Parti 
(Democrat Party - DP), Cumhuriyetçi Güven Party (Republican Trust Party - CGP), 
Millet Partisi (Millet Party - MP), Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party - ANAP), 
Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party - MDP), Doğru Yol 
Partisi (True Path Party – DYP), Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s 
Party- CHP), Halkçı Parti (Populist Party - HP), Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti 
(Social Democrat Populist Party-SHP), Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party 
- DSP), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party- MSP), Refah Partisi 
(Welfare Party – RP), Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party- 
MHP), Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (National Work Party – MÇP). 
 
As observed from the table, the percentage of the centre-left votes declined 
gradually after the military rule. In addition to this declining trend, Ecevit’s 
appearance under a new party, DSP, caused the division of the votes in the centre-
left. Military’s anti-communist stance and appeal to Islamic elements was another 
factor decreasing the influence of the leftist groups. 
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Another party losing power was the statist bureaucracy which was replaced 
with managerial cadres in accordance with market economy’s considerations. 359 
Especially Özal’s insistence on collaborating with technocrats rather than bureaucrats 
facilitated this change.  
 
5.5 A Brief Assessment of the Military in Turkish Politics After 1983 
 
The military’s role within the society changed after all these developments. 
Military intervened politics when the political elites were in conflict. Therefore, 
rather than an arbiter role it has played before 1980s, the military, itself became a key 
political actor in the Turkish politics. Military permitted ANAP’s entry to the 
elections unlike the other parties (SODEP and DYP) which have been perceived as 
the successor of the AP and CHP. In the post-1983 years, military and government 
maintained the division of labor without major challenges during Özal’s prime 
ministry. In addition to that, the relationship between the political executive and the 
president helped military to be less concerned about the conduct of political affairs. 
Therefore, military could return to its barracks as planned. Apparently, the 
international pressure and the inclination of the intelligentsia and politicians caused 
the military to accept a diminishing role in politics. The military’s confidence in the 
president’s role as guardian of the statist institutions let the military to concentrate 
more on the operational matters. The President responded calmly to the critics over 
his reign and the influence of military within the politics. Eventually, the politics has 
become civilianized in 1989 with the election of Özal as the first civilian president 
since the 1960. Özal’s presidency closed the gap between the statist elites and 
political elites.360 Özal’s successor would again be a civilian, Süleyman Demirel. 
Election of Demirel was another signal for the civilianization of the regime after the 
Torumtay’s resignation as a result of his disagreement with Özal. Özbudun argues 
that, instead of formal change in institutions, the practice indicated that the regime 
has started to become civilianized but was still a little distant from a full-fledged 
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civilian democracy. 361 For example, the February 1997 meeting of the MGK 
declaring the threat perception for the secularism and General Staff’s e-memorandum 
in April 2007 in a softer but similar discourse proved that the military finds the 
necessary means to intervene when the political events concern its interests, 
particularly the continuity of secular-democracy. This indicates that the democracy 
has not been consolidated yet, in other terms the military still considers its 
interference into the politics as legitimate as long as the values of the state cherished 
by the military as territorial integrity and secularism were challenged.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this study, transitions to democracy in Spain and Turkey have been analysed. I 
find it necessary to refer to typologies of transitions to democracy to make a 
comparative analysis of these two transitions. Obviously, modes of transition vary for 
each country. Thus, the discussion about an accurate typology for categorizing 
transitions to democracy is very dynamic. For example, O’Donnell and Schmitter find it 
appropriate to distinguish between, on the one hand, transitions initiated by successful, 
confident regimes which control the rhythm and scope of liberalization, and, on the 
other hand transitions initiated by the opposition, which generally occur where the 
regime has failed. Therefore, O’Donnell and Schmitter believe in the primacy of the 
initial conditions of the transition.362 Stepan contributes to the debate with a typology 
which distinguishes transitions to democracy as “initiated by the wielders of 
authoritarian power” and as changes in which “oppositional forces play the major role”. 
He emphasizes the nature of the dominant elites leading the transitions as being either 
civilian or military.363 Mainwaring offers another typology in which he places 
importance on the extent to which the transition process is influenced by the outgoing 
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authoritarian regime. Authoritarian regimes exert less influence following a defeat, and 
more when they introduce the process of liberalization and remain a decisive actor 
throughout the transition. He defines the intermediary category as “extrication” in 
which an authoritarian government might negotiate crucial features of the transition, 
even though the government holds a weaker position than in other examples of 
transition through transaction.364 Unlike these typologies based on a single dimension, 
Agüero offers a two-dimensional categorization where the nature of the dominant elite 
during the transition and the extent to which the outgoing regime and type of transition 
matter. 
 
Table 12. Typology of Transitions from Authoritarian Regimes 
Nature of 
Dominant Elite 
Extent of Influence by Outgoing Regime, and Type of Transition 
Very Low 
(Collapse) 
Intermediate 
(Extrication) 
High 
(Transaction) 
Civilian 
 
 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Greece 
Venezuela 
Hungary 
Poland 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Soviet Union 
SPAIN 
Military 
 
Argentina 
       Portugal 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Uruguay 
TURKEY 
Brazil 
Chile 
Paraguay 
Source: Felipe Agüero, “Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern 
Europe and South America,” in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-
Jürgen Puhle, The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 146 (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995)365. 
 
6.1 A Comparison of Transitions to Democracy in Spain and Turkey 
 
Initial Conditions. The initial conditions in the transitions in Spain and Turkey 
were different. For instance, the Spanish case constituted an example of “transition 
through transaction”, where the transition was conducted under an authoritarian 
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constitution, enabling authoritarian elites to command high levels of influence over the 
transition. Nevertheless, the nature of the dominant elite during the transition in Spain 
was civilian. The Spanish political system was already civilianised in the later years 
under Franco. Meanwhile, the transition in Turkey was initiated under similar 
conditions where authoritarian arrangement limited political and social rights. However, 
unlike the transition in Spain, the military elite was dominant. The Spanish civilians’ 
relative advantage over the military in influencing the transition was mainly caused by 
the crisis in the outgoing regime - Franco’s authoritarian regime. As discussed earlier in 
this study, Franco’s regime had internal divisions which disturbed stability and 
prevented the taking of the necessary precautions for stabilising the political and 
economic conditions. In addition, civilianisation and liberalisation within the regime 
were already underway. By the time of Franco’s death, the liberals and the democratic 
opposition within the country were able to emerge to demand further liberalisation 
which would be followed by democratization. Therefore, despite the influence of 
conservative parties within the regime, the support for democratic reforms had already 
been widely favoured by society. The rising number of strikes and incidents of political 
violence indicated the discontent within society towards authoritarian rule. On the other 
hand, three years of military rule in Turkey had started as a result of political decay in 
civilian governments. Thousands of people lost their lives in political violence, and 
economic conditions were worsening. The military acted quickly to solve these 
problems and overcame them. The military’s success provided popular legitimacy for 
the regime. The failures of the civilian government which led to the country into a 
political turmoil were not easily forgotten.  
In addition to these, the MGK had limited the degree of political participation in 
elections and constitutional debates. Therefore, the military kept itself in a privileged 
position during the initial years of the transition. The confident regime in Turkey 
determined the rhythm of political liberalisation. The high level of support for the 
proposed constitution proved that the public consented to the initial conditions 
established by the military.366 These factors caused the difference in the dominant 
political elite in the transitions in Spain and Turkey.  Agüero’s findings from South 
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American and Southern European cases reveal that transitions dominated by civilians 
were more likely to achieve democratic consolidation.367 The military’s quest for 
institutional autonomy limits democratization.368 The conditions during transition might 
allow the military to guarantee prerogatives outside its own interests. The unity of 
civilians challenges the military’s influence in transitions. The experiences in South 
America indicate that the military perceives party politics as a threat to its institutional 
cohesion, and also sees it as disruptive and divisive for the whole nation, whereas the 
military itself (supposedly) presents a picture of national unity against internal and 
external enemies.369 In both of the cases studied in this thesis, the military preserved its 
institutional autonomy during the transition process. However, the Spanish case differed 
from the Turkish case where the military preserved tutelary powers, e.g. strong 
presidential powers, constitutional arrangements. In Turkey, civilians were unable to 
unite against the military’s entrenched position. The transition was initiated and 
controlled from above, and political participation was limited by constitutional 
provisions. On the other hand, civilians in Spain reached agreements among themselves 
during the transitions; hence they were able to prevent the military from exerting 
influence over the transition process. Civilians did not feel obliged to make pacts with 
the military. Therefore the initiative was left entirely in the hands of civilians for the 
future.370  In short, initial conditions differed in these two cases. The military in both 
countries voiced their preferences and demanded guarantees for them in the post-
transition years. However, those civilian agreements in Spain provided a favourable 
atmosphere for democratic advancement.371 Hence, initial conditions played an 
important role in the democratic consolidation, the Spanish and Turkish cases reveal. 
Yet, initial conditions by themselves explain only a part of the whole picture.  
 Developments in the post-transition period.  Democratic consolidation requires 
favourable developments in the post-transition period, too. The military might challenge 
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democracy even after the transition phase. To give an example from our specific cases, 
the transition to democracy in Spain failed to prevent a coup attempt by Colonel Tejero 
in February 1981. Failure of the coup attempt signalled the consolidation of democracy 
in Spain. Civilian political elites and different segments of the military united against 
this attempt, thereby emphasising the supremacy of civilians in Spanish politics. The 
plotters were punished. The current role of the military in Turkish politics confirms the 
military’s ongoing effectiveness in challenging the political supremacy of civilians. The 
relations between civilians and the military have always been a focal point of 
constitutional reforms. In particular, the role of the MGK and its memorandum about 
the rise of political Islam in Turkey, indicate the ongoing influence of the military on 
civilians. Although political Islam itself challenges the democratic process in Turkey, it 
is fair to argue that the military also challenges democratic advancement in Turkish 
politics. However, Turkey’s transition to democracy experience allows us to argue that 
the military’s influence vis-à-vis civilians diminished, especially during the second term 
of the ANAP government between 1987 and 1991.   
Several factors, as suggested by Agüero, are more or less favourable for 
democratic advancement. These factors include: the unity of civilians, the legitimacy of 
successor governments, policies and strategies in the area of the civil-military relations 
process, and international factors. 372 
 Public Support for Successor Government: Agüero claims that “the capacity of 
governments to advance democratic policies regarding the military is strongly 
influenced by their ability to maintain high levels of public support. The military finds it 
harder to impose non-democratic prerogatives and to resist government policies when 
the government is visibly backed by a wide array of popular political forces.”373 Support 
for the ANAP government in Turkey was gained through the first multiparty election 
after military rule, albeit in a semi-competitive fashion, in 1983. Despite president 
Evren’s support for the MDP, the ANAP achieved a comfortable victory in the 1983 
elections. However, public support for the government was adversely affected by two 
factors. First, the elections were not truly competitive. Therefore the voters were left 
with few options when the major parties of the 1970s or their successors were excluded 
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from the elections. Thus the representativeness of the parliament and the legitimacy of 
Özal’s government were questionable. Özal was able to overcome this problem in the 
1984 municipality elections when successor parties were allowed to compete, but the 
real test was the 1987 elections when former leaders of the 1970s were allowed to lead 
their parties. The other factor was the popularity of President Evren. In addition to his 
personal charisma as a top military commander, his appointment to the presidency 
through a provisional article in the 1982 Constitution was approved by an 
overwhelming majority in the constitutional referendum. Thanks to strengthened 
presidential powers, Evren acted as the head of state and the cabinet in controversial 
issues. The government meanwhile conducted day-to-day administration of state affairs 
and dealt with economic issues. However, Özal’s autonomy in economic issues helped 
him to increase level of public support. The handling of the economy is an important 
determinant of public support for the government. The stabilizing reforms initiated in 
the early 1980 and Özal’s export-led growth strategy brought economic recovery, 
thanks to the limited room for political participation, or opposition in other words. 
Without opposition, the government comfortably implemented economic policies and 
advice. Özal’s popularity increased as a result of these positive developments in the 
economic sphere. Özal’s confidence in appointing Necip Torumtay as CGS instead of 
the military-supported candidate, General Üruğ, in July 1987 might be explained by 
growing popular support. Another example of this linkage between popular support for 
the government and democratization policies regarding the military was related to the 
subordination of the CGS to the defence ministry. Although Özal’s election campaign 
included this structural change, he decided to delay implementation, as popular support 
for his party declined in the 1987 elections. A similar trend in Spain also supports the 
main argument. The decline in support for Suarez’s government during 1980 because of 
high unemployment rates and rising terrorist activities (including the targeting of 
military figures) caused the military’s discontent with the regime. Suarez’s excessive 
democratization reforms were disliked by the military, and, combined with the decline 
in popular support for Suarez; the result was the failed military coup in 1981. This trend 
in popular support for the government was reversed by the PSOE’s clear victory in the 
1982 elections. The Socialist party achieved a homogenous and stable government 
majority and so it was able to implement significant reforms in the military and in the 
general organization of defence. Therefore, both cases prove the theory about the role of 
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popular support for government and the pace of reforms, particularly in civil-military 
relations.  
The Timing and Pace of Reforms: Preventing the interference of the military into 
politics is a major step in the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, it needs to be 
accompanied by the prominence of civilian government officials in the defence sector. 
The reforms in the defence sector are conditioned by two considerations. Firstly, the 
government should act cautiously, to avoid a situation where the military might take a 
firm stance against reforms, and secondly, reforms should be accomplished before the 
military institutionalizes its influence in the post-transitional setting. Gradual reforms 
generally seem more sensible from the viewpoint of civilian elites because of several 
factors. Firstly, civilians’ inexperience in the initial phase of the democratization may 
cause them to give higher priority to other important policy areas. Secondly, mutual 
confidence between civilian and military elites increases when reforms are postponed.  
Thirdly, civilians would gradually gain expertise in defence and military affairs. 
However, this tendency to delay the reforms might become detrimental to the seizure of 
opportunities for the expansion of democratic prerogatives. Therefore, determining the 
right time and pace of the reform are crucial for achieving civilian supremacy.374 During 
the transition to democracy in Spain, the secondary role of the military in the transition 
was accompanied by the alienation of civilians from the military’s internal affairs. As 
discussed earlier, senior promotions within the military establishment caused conflicts 
between civilians and soldiers. The gradual reform within the defence sector was 
initiated by General Mellado, a member of the liberal wing of the military cadres. 
However the military was dealing with rising terrorist activities by ETA, and internal 
reforms only constituted a secondary role in the military’s agenda. The failed coup 
attempt was a major turning point which symbolized the military’s declining role in 
Spanish politics. Despite favourable conditions for civilian supremacy over the military, 
including liberal attitudes within the military, substantial reforms in the defence sector 
were not implemented until the PSOE became confident of its electoral support. The 
major changes in the government’s attitude towards a reform in the defence sector 
appeared in 1984, almost two years after the PSOE’s victory in the 1982 elections.  
Therefore, Spanish civilians waited patiently until gaining adequate power and 
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accumulating expertise on defence issues. In Chapter 4, I referred to Martinez’s study in 
which he analyzed the presence of growing numbers of civilians in CESEDEN. This 
tendency might have facilitated the civilians to feel confident enough in the mid-1980s 
to restructure the defence policy of Spain. To sum up, the timing of reforms 
significantly affected the success of the civilianisation of the defence policies. If 
initiated earlier than the failed coup attempt or before the PSOE gained a comfortable 
majority in Congress, the military might have reacted against the reform attempts with a 
stronger corporate stance. Hence, the civilians’ impatience might have adversely 
affected the attempts for democratization as a whole. Therefore, the timing of the 
defence sector reforms appears as perfectly scheduled within the whole calendar of 
democratization in Spain. In Turkey, on the other hand, during the political 
liberalization phase and ANAP’s first term, the civilian government consented to a 
modus vivendi with the military. Therefore, any attempt to provoke the military was 
avoided until Özal’s interference in senior promotions within the General Staff. The 
defence ministry functioned as an administrative organ for the General Staff. The 
General Staff reported to the Prime Minister instead of the defence ministry. Özal 
promised a change during the 1987 election campaign, but felt weakened after the 
election results. Although he achieved a majority of seats, which allowed him to 
establish a single party government, Özal preferred not to provoke the military while his 
government’s popular support was declining. The 1991 election and its aftermath 
showed that the party system was fragmented again. Coalition governments replaced 
single-party government. Therefore, reforms in controversial areas such as the defence 
sector were delayed. In conclusion, the civilian officials’ satisfaction with a situation of 
peaceful coexistence with the military caused a failure in incorporating the defence 
sector into the main framework of the reform process during the transition to democracy 
in Turkey. Certain limited changes in alignment because of the EU accession criteria 
only recently have been achieved.  
International Factors:  The International environment and membership of 
international institutions occasionally play a facilitating role in democratization. Two 
prominent international institutions, NATO and the EC, influenced both Spain and 
Turkey during their democratization. However, in comparison, their influence on Spain 
was greater. Turkey was already a member of NATO. Therefore, the Turkish military 
did not require a radical modernisation or transformation. NATO was reluctant to voice 
concerns over domestic issues in both countries. Nevertheless, Spain’s NATO 
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membership campaign was given priority consideration by the PSOE government as 
soon as they came to power. Spain became a member of NATO following a referendum 
in 1986. NATO membership transformed Spanish military’s mission away from 
previous domestic concerns towards external professional concerns. The transformation 
of the Spanish military facilitated democratisation. In Spain, efforts toward civilian 
supremacy were intensified by NATO membership whereas in Turkey the effect of 
NATO membership during democratisation was not so obvious. Yet, the Turkish 
military was experiencing an endogenous transformation in convergence with NATO’s 
objectives, too. For example, by 1992, in accordance with NATO’s policies toward 
professionalism, the Turkish military adopted a gradual transformation including a 
decrease in the length of the conscription period to twelve months.375 This would 
gradually shift the balance within the military in favour of trained professional soldiers 
rather than young conscripts. Although this transformation marked one of the most 
significant shifts in the Turkish military for decades, the impact of NATO membership 
on civilian supremacy was less influential than in Spain. On the other hand, Spain’s 
environment was strongly supportive of democracy. After Franco, ongoing economic 
integration among the European states under the umbrella of the EC attracted Spain to 
become a part of this integration. The industrial bourgeoisie in Spain was strongly in 
favour of membership of the EC. Membership of the EC also helped governments to 
impose unpopular measures at home under the supranational policies of EC.376  
Compared to the favourable conditions for Spain, Turkey’s international environment 
was less conducive to democratisation. The democratic performances of Turkey’s 
neighbours’ were considerably poorer than that of Spain’s neighbours. Nevertheless, the 
Turkish military was aware of international commitments. They publicly confirmed 
their loyalty to democratic norms in their declarations. In addition, Turkey’s 
membership of the EC was more problematic than Spain’s. Turkey’s official application 
for membership in 1987 was declined by the EC in 1989. The EC complained about 
human rights violations and the level of minority rights in Turkey. The Turkish 
government had to take this development into consideration in order to integrate Turkey 
into Europe. Even though this development urged governments to take the necessary 
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measures for democracy, it is difficult to decide what extent these democratisation 
endeavours helped to achieve the supremacy of civilians over the military. The 
international environment, especially following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
would not favour military rule. Therefore the risk of a coup d’etat was diminished by 
the early 1990s. However, it is not sufficient to identify the political system with 
civilian supremacy. To sum up, Spain’s international environment was more conducive 
for achieving civilian supremacy over the military.  
 The difference between the Spanish case and the Turkish case might be 
explained by Pridham’s different definitions of democratic consolidation. According to 
Pridham, consolidation can be negative or positive. Negative consolidation includes 
“the solution of any problems remaining from transition process and containment or 
reduction, if not removal, of any serious challenges to democratization.”377 Whereas 
positive consolidation “refers to wider or deeper levels of the overall process.....includes 
the inculcation of democratic values at both elite and mass levels, and, therefore, it 
involves some remaking of the political culture in a direction that is a system supportive 
for a new democracy.” 378 The Turkish case proves that the civilian political elite was 
satisfied with negative consolidation. Following a period of military rule, Özal came to 
power with his centre-right party (ANAP) and adopted the principle of coexistence with 
the military. During his first term, he adopted a moderate discourse, especially on 
subjects sensitive for the military. Therefore, he continued with economic reforms. He 
used a moderate discourse in order to relieve tensions with the military and President 
Evren at the time of a possible conflict. Considering the Turkish generals’ reluctance to 
stay in power, the civilian leadership might have found the grounds to push for a 
positive consolidation to create a political culture supportive of democracy. During the 
initial years of political liberalization, other civilian political elites were interested in 
getting permission from the MGK for their parties and their leaders to participate in 
elections. As soon as they get permission, they sought political competition. They were 
quite satisfied with the military’s acquiescence in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, this 
satisfaction was followed in February 1998 by the military’s publicly-announced 
reaction against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Apparently, the military’s practice 
contrary to democratic ideals was mainly caused by the combination of two factors. The 
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first factor was the fragmentation of the civilian political elite, which facilitated the rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism, and secondly, those elites were content to remain at a level 
of negative consolidation rather than positive consolidation. The military, with legal 
tutelary powers in the new democracy, voiced its concerns over the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism. On the other hand, the Spanish political elite insisted on civilian 
supremacy over the military. Initially, civilians dominated the transition, through 
agreements and pacts among different parties of the society. Hence, they prevented the 
military from imposing its preferences on sensitive issues for democracy, e.g. the 
legalization of the Communist party and greater autonomy for certain regions. In 
addition, they diminished the number of ministers representing each branch of the 
institution to a single defence ministry. This change also contributed to the military’s 
institutionalization within the new democratic regime. The unity of the civilians as a 
response to the coup attempt in 1981 was another factor in the failure. Following the 
failed coup attempts, the PSOE government pursued NATO membership with 
determination. Therefore, Spanish civilians succeeded in securing civilian supremacy 
alongside adequate institutional autonomy for the military for efficient pursuit of its 
mission. In conclusion, the Spanish and Turkish cases differed in the level of 
consolidation pursued by civilian elites. The Spanish military acted in a more assertive 
manner than the Turkish military. The Turkish military never attempted a coup during 
the political liberalization and transition to democracy phases despite unexpected 
developments such as Özal’s attempt to by-pass bureaucracy and top commanders in 
foreign policy, or political liberalisation earlier than expected. Rather, they were aware 
of the negative impact of a coup attempt on internal unity of the military and on 
international commitments of the country.  
 In summary, Spain and Turkey experienced transitions from authoritarian rule to 
democracy. Transition in Spain was followed by democratic consolidation, including 
civilian supremacy over the military, whereas transition to democracy in Turkey failed 
to pave the way for democratic consolidation. The nature of the dominant elite during 
the transition explains this difference between Spain and Turkey, to a certain extent. 
Although transition in Turkey was initiated and controlled from above, it would be hard 
to claim that the military was able to reach all of its objectives. Instead, the power 
struggle between the civilians and the military provided unexpected outcomes as in the 
case of the very first example of failing to establish a civilian cabinet during the military 
rule and in the case of political liberalisation. Thus, it is not sufficient to explain the 
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whole process by referring to initial conditions. The process displayed more dynamism 
than this sort of a scenario could offer. The transition in Turkey would be better 
explained by referring to rational interest calculations for each of the actors. Different 
actors pursued their own preferences and shaped the institutional design of the political 
system in the aftermath of the transition to democracy. Özal contested the military and 
possessed considerable capacity for leading political reform process, especially in his 
second term, even though the military entered the period of civilian rule from a position 
of strength. Özal’s efforts to by-pass bureaucracy and determine senior promotions 
within the military were significant examples of his contesting of the military’s 
influence during the transition.  Similarly, banned political leaders challenged the 
restrictions on political participation and achieved their wish to lead their political 
parties legally. Therefore, the Turkish case supports Hunter’s argument that rational 
interest calculation determines the actions of military and civilian elites during 
transition to democracy. According to her, the mode of transition affects the balance of 
power in the new regime; however, its impact is much weaker and more short-lived than 
expected.379  Despite the complaints of civilians over the role of military in the post-
authoritarian era, their disunity and ambiguous attitude toward civilian supremacy 
explain the low level of military subordination to civilians in Turkey. However, it is 
also fair to argue that if the rational interests of military and civilian institutions comply 
with the premises of democracy, civilian supremacy over the military might be achieved 
in Turkey, as well. To conclude: contrary to the claims of some analysts, the 
performance of Turkey in the transition to democracy has been satisfactory and the 
situation regarding further progress in this sphere is far from hopeless. 
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